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INSTITUTIONS AS RELATIONAL INVESTORS: A NEW
LOOK AT CUMULATIVE VOTING

Jeffrey N. Gordon*
The hostile takeover may have become a receding memory, but the
problem that the market in corporate control purported to address nevertheless remains. In a world of imperfect competition, the product, capital, and managerial markets may temporarily indulge suboptimal
performance by a firm's managers. As cases such as GM, Sears, American
Express, and IBM illustrate, a firm with a substantial franchise and substantial financial reserves can sustain deteriorating economic performance over a significant period, resulting in a long slow slide of economic
values. Shareholders and society generally will benefit from a mechanism
that replaces the firm's incumbent managers well before the firm succumbs to competitive forces.1 The shareholder interest is obvious: as the
Copyright © 1994 Jeffrey N. Gordon.
* Professor of Law, Columbia University, and Co-Director, Center for Law and
Economic Studies. I have had the benefit of discussion and comments from Akhil Amar,
Bernie Black, Jack Coffee, Ron Gilson, Lewis Kornhauser, Lou Lowenstein, Mark Roe, and
participants at the May 1993 conference on "Relational Investing" sponsored by the
Institutional Investor Project of the Columbia University Center for Law and Economic
Studies. I received valuable research assistance from Andrew Shapiro and David Gross.
Virginia K. Rosenbaum of the Investor Responsibility Research Center shared unpublished
data on cumulative voting in firms that the IRRC follows.
For my father and mother.
1. This is based on an assumption that corporate governance matters to the
performance of the firm and thus significantly affects performance of the national
economy. This assumption might be contested by those who believe that another factor,
such as technological innovation or education of the work force, is the key variable and
that governance, if it matters at all, is marginal. Corporate governance matters, however,
because management matters. Most industrial organization theorists have dropped the
idea of the firm as simply a production function-a mixture in a black box of labor,
materials, and technology that ferments to produce goods-in exchange for the view that
the firm is a governance structure in which management is constantly making critical
decisions about which activities should be organized under one roof-the firm-and
which should be coordinated through markets. (The seminal paper was R.H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica N.S. 386 (1937).) As business historian Alfred Chandler
has argued, managers' strategic and organizational choices-not the availability of
particular inputs-are the most important elements of firm level and national economic
performance. See Alfred D. Chandler, Scale and Scope: The Dynamics of Industrial
Capitalism (Takashi Hikino asst., 1990) (comparative study of United States, Great Britain
and Germany); Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in
American Business (1977) (study of changing modes of managerial organization in U.S.).
Because management matters, corporate governance-which seeks to hold managers
accountable for their choices and use of the firm's resources-also should matter.
Sometimes corporate governance will have limited significance, particularly for firms
operating in highly competitive markets with limited capital needs. In such an
environment, in which the existence of the firm is continuously at stake, the product
market will discipline managers more vigorously than any board could. But in the world in
which most large firms operate-one characterized by imperfect competition and large
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firm heads to oblivion, share values head to zero. The social interest is no
less compelling, since wasteful use of real economic resources reduces
society's wealth and since the consequences of poor management are
2
eventually shared by workers, suppliers, customers, and communities.
The hostile takeover became important in the 1970s and 1980s at
least in part because of the legal, practical and cultural barriers to internal shareholder mobilization at a time of accelerating economic change.
The low rate of internal shareholder intervention to replace managers
who followed suboptimal strategies opened up opportunities for takeover
entrepreneurs. As events in the late 1980s demonstrated, however, hostile takeovers were not an ideal intervention mechanism. The transaction
costs were high; the associated financial market structure became overextended; the legal rules promoted "last dollar" auctions that, among other
factors, led to bidder overpayment and fragile financial structures; the
magnitude of the transactions led to speculation and illegality; and the
eventual political reaction produced deal-breaking legal rules that were
perversely more protective of managers than ever before.3
Moreover, the classic 1980s bust-up takeover may now be obsolete.
Those transactions addressed a specific problem-the unwieldy, often
unmanageable business that was a legacy of an earlier wave of conglomerate acquisitions. In evaluating such a situation, takeover entrepreneurs
did not need much information: only that pieces of the business were
worth more in the relevant asset markets than was the business as a
whole. As a result of this activity, and the preemptive restructuring unsunk organizational and physical capital-the board has a much more significant role in
holding managers to account.
This footnote reflects an ongoing collaboration with Ron Gilson and Mark Roe on a
grant proposal for research on "Governance of the Twenty-first Century Corporation" (on
file with author).
2. This illustrates the point that the maximization of social welfare is not necessarily
inconsistent with using the shareholder wealth maximization criterion as the lodestar for
corporate governance. Indeed, the ultimate defense of the shareholder wealth criterion
must be cast in social welfare terms: that the sum of payouts by the firm-wages, supplier
payments, dividends, interest, and taxes-will be maximized by a system that assigns the
residual clalm to shareholders and empowers them to select managers who will act
responsively. This is not an uncomplicated point, however, since good management of a
declining firm may decide, for example, that plant closings and other disruptions are
necessary. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 Colum. L. Rev.
1931, 1953-54 (1991).
3. See id. at 1931-32, 1948-56; see also Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992)
(giving greater freedom to managers in proxy battles for control); Stahl v. Apple Bancorp,
Inc., 579 A.2d 1115 (Del. Ch. 1990) (same).
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., Nos. 427,428, 1993 WL 50302
(Del. Dec. 9, 1993) is not to the contrary. In entering into a merger agreement that would
have shifted control of Paramount to a single large shareholder, the Paramount board was
found to have come under a duty to obtain the best value available for stockholders, and in
particular, to compare competitive offers from Viacom and QVC. The Court in no way
suggested that Paramount would have been obliged to accept an unsolicited bid from QVC
without the prior decision of the board to sell control to Viacom.
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dertaken by many firms, this particular problem has been substantially

addressed. The competitiveness and performance problems that now
seem most important are likely to require much more information to fix.
This suggests that a strategy that works from within the corporation might
add value over a strategy driven by capital markets.

Corporate law academics, many of them my Columbia colleagues,
have recently promoted the idea that a happy alternative to hostile takeovers may be possible within the existing share ownership distribution of
the large public corporation. Since institutional investors hold 55 percent of the stock of the largest 100 firms, 4 appropriate changes in legal
rules and institutional culture could make it possible for institutional investors to serve a new role in corporate governance. This stock ownership pattern also provides an important reason for a new institutional
role: as the traditional means by which institutions have expressed dissatisfaction with management-exit by selling the stock-becomes increasingly costly,- a new strategy of "voice" becomes increasingly desirable. 6
4. See Carolyn Y. Brancato & Patrick A. Gaughan, Institutional Investors and Capital
Markets: 1991 Update, Columbia Institutional Investor Project, Center for Law and
Economic Studies, Columbia University School of Law tbl. 19 (Sept. 1991) (on file with the
Columbia Law Review). In 1990, institutions owned 50.1 percent of the stock of the top 50
firms, weighted by market value, 59.2 percent of the stock of firms ranked 51-100, and 54.7
percent of the stock of the firms ranked 101-250. As to the distribution of
shareownership, of the top 1000 firms, institutions owned over 50 percent of the stock in
approximately 50 percent of the firms. See id. tbl. 20; see also Carolyn K Brancato, The
Pivotal Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets, in Institutional Investing:
Challenges and Responsibilities of the 21st Century 3, 21 (Arnold W. Sametz ed., 1991)
(describing institutional investors' ownership in U.S. corporations from 1987 to 1989).
5. The costs are incurred in the discount often associated with the sale of a large
block of stock and by search and transactions costs associated with the subsequent need to
rebalance portfolios. Many institutions want to hold portfolios that include the entire
market, particularly index funds, so exit is not feasible. Similarly, a desire driven by
diversification concerns to hold portfolios that represent significant market segments may
make exit especially costly. See Manhattan Institute Center for Corporate Governance
Forum: How Should Institutional Investors Relate to Corporate Boards and Management
21-22 (Apr. 20, 1993) (transcript on file with author) (Remarks of Carol O'Cleireacain,
Commissioner, New York City Department of Finance) ("Divesting from all underperformers would send transaction costs skyrocketing, reduce our diversification
drastically, and destroy our ability to track any index."); Stern Stewart, Roundtable on
Relationship Investing and Shareholder Communication, 6J. Applied Corp. Fin. 4, 30-31
(1993) (remarks of Ned Regan on public pension funds as "indexed, permanent owners").
6. Compare Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional
Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 822-24 (1992) (elimination of regulatory barriers
would foster institutional monitoring) with John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control:
The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277, 1283 (1991)
(skepticism about institutional activism unless incentive structure changed) and RonaldJ.
Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director. An Agenda for
Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863, 865-67 (1991) (increasing pattern of widely,
diversified stock ownership makes compelling a corporate governance strategy for
institutions) and Jeffrey N. Gordon, Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game
Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law, 60 U. Cin.L. Rev. 347, 376-79 (1991) (expressing
concern with direct institutional voice unmediated through board) and MarkJ. Roe, Some
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Some argue that the model to which institutional engagement
should aspire is "relational investing," in which institutions see themselves
as long term investors in the firm-owners-rather than as short term
traders or arbitrageurs. 7 As a preliminary matter, this Article sets forth
and defends a specific model of the means of such investor behaviorthe "board composition" approach. This approach holds that institutional investors in their role as relational investors in the large public
corporation should primarily exert influence to enhance the quality, independence, and accountability of the board, rather than to intervene in
business decision-making.
The ability of institutional investors successfully to pursue a board
composition approach to relational investing may depend to a significant
extent upon the mechanisms of director selection. Hence, this Article
proposes that institutions should attempt to revive cumulative voting, a
vehicle for proportional board representation of significant shareholder
minorities, which was a common feature in corporate governance until

the managerialist assaults of the 1950s.8 Adoption of cumulative voting
would not ordinarily produce election contests waged by institutional inDifferences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and the United States, 102 Yale L.J.
1927 (1993) (in alternative regulatory, economic, and political structure, institutional
monitoring could arise and perhaps be useful).
7. See, e.g., Louis Lowenstein, Sense and Nonsense in Corporate Finance 211-17
(1991) (describing DuPont minority interest in GM in 1920s as "a model for what might yet
be"). Professor Lowenstein has also expressed skepticism about the compatibility of the
American investing style to a high level of relational investing. See Louis Lowenstein,
"More Like Whom?"J. Corp. L. (forthcoming 1994).
8. Cumulative voting is best understood in contrast to "straight" voting, under which a
separate contest is held for each board seat, so that the vote of a simple majority
determines every seat (except in the case of three or more candidates without a provision
for runoff elections, where a plurality is sufficient). In the business corporation context,
straight voting ensures that a majority shareholder elects all the directors. Under
cumulative voting, candidates are elected as a group, by a rule that permits a sufficiently
large minority to win one or more seats. In the corporate context, a shareholder receives,
for each share, a number of votes equal to the number of directors to be elected, which
may be allocated among the candidates as the shareholder chooses. Well-known formulas
inform the minority (and the majority) how to allocate votes for maximum effect. The
greater the number of directors to be elected, the smaller the minority block necessary to
elect one director. See, e.g., Edward Aranow & Herbert Einhorn, Proxy Contests for
Corporate Control 331-33 (2d ed. 1968). These formulas derive from Arthur T. Cole, Jr.,
Legal and Mathematical Aspects of Cumulative Voting, 2 S.C.L.Q. 225 (1950); see also
Amihal Glazer et al.,
Cumulative Voting in Corporate Elections: Introducing Strategy into
the Equation, 35 S.C. L. Rev. 295, 299-306 (1984) (developing equation based on game
theoretic notions that produces same result as Cole's in case of two-bloc competition
where, as in usual corporate case, total number of shares voted is very large in relation to
number of directors to be elected, and noting that a more sophisticated procedure is
necessary for competition among blocs of 3 or more); Lewis R. Mills, The Mathematics of
Cumulative Voting, 1968 Duke LJ. 28 (correcting Cole's equation in case of fractional
voting rights); John Kasdan, Ties in Cumulative Voting (Columbia University Center for
Law & Economic Studies Working Paper No. 98, 1993) (refining formula to account for
possibility of ties).
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vestors but rather would give institutions additional leverage in negotiations over the composition of the board. This would enhance the
directors' sense of independence from management and accountability
to shareholders. The traditional objection to cumulative voting-that it
encourages disruption and rent-seeking by minority interests-would not
generally apply to the candidates for this proposal, large public corporations in which activist institutions have a significant ownership stake. Institutions are likely to use power added by cumulative voting to pursue
strategies that will increase share values, producing gains that are common to all shareholders, rather than to extract private gains, such as
greenmail. Thus, unlike the traditional argument for (and against) cumulative voting in terms of the desirability of minority representation,
this Article argues that cumulative voting in the large public firm can
provide a means for virtual representation of majority interests by a wellmotivated minority.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I presents the argument for the
board composition approach for institutional investors engaged in relational investing. In order to understand the scope of the proposal and
the new role that cumulative voting can play in corporate governance, it
is important to understand the history of cumulative voting in American
corporate law, a peculiar story, in which a governance mechanism drawn
from the political realm was made to apply to private corporations. Parts
II and III explore, respectively, the rise and fall of cumulative voting as a
mandatory feature of state law, and as a relatively common feature of
corporate charters. For both states and individual firms, the elimination
of cumulative voting appears to have been catalyzed by managerial concern that cumulative voting rendered firms more vulnerable to proxy
contests or takeover bids.
This observation, however, does not yield the conclusion that cumulative voting should be reinstated as a mandatory state or federal legal
rule. Despite the crucial role of entrenchment motives in triggering the
legislative elimination of mandatory cumulative voting, the evidence is far
from clear that cumulative voting increases aggregate shareholder welfare
across all firms at all times. This is illustrated by a case study of California's recent elimination of mandatory cumulative voting. In fact, empirical and historical evidence developed in Part III shows that elimination of
cumulative voting by large public firms often will reduce shareholder
welfare, at least at times when the market in corporate control is active.
But the question whether cumulative voting has value as an internal governance mechanism, as opposed to an adjunct of the market for control,
is unresolved by the empirical evidence.
Part IV develops a new rationale for cumulative voting in the large
public corporation, one that is suited to a time when hostile takeovers will
be rare and institutions will choose to exercise "voice" rather than "exit."
Because of the recent changes in the ownership structure of large public
firms, cumulative voting has a new role to play in corporate governance:
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it can provide access to the boardroom for activist institutions, who will
serve as virtual representatives for other public shareholders. Such institutional engagement has reasonable prospects of enhancing the independence and accountability, and thus the effectiveness, of the board in its
monitoring of management. These improvements are likely to increase
shareholder welfare, particularly at a time when a firm's adaptability to
changing competitive conditions is becoming especially important. Thus,
for firms of appropriate ownership structure, cumulative voting
reemerges as a valuable part of the internal governance mechanism. Part
IV also develops an implementation strategy for the revival of cumulative
voting, which would require obtaining majority shareholder endorsement
and eventually acceptance by the incumbent board, and explains why
managements should be amenable to the change.
I. INSTITUTIONS AS RELATIONAL INVESTORS

Relational investing depends on the interrelation of three elements:
substantial share ownership, a commitment to an extended holding period, and a reciprocal engagement with management over the business
policy decisions of the firm. Substantial share ownership is important because it carries voting power, which increases management's receptivity
to shareholder engagement; because it bonds the investor's belief in the
value of the engagement; and because it may bond the investor's commitment to a long-term relationship (depending on liquidity of the stock.9 )
A credible commitment to an extended holding period similarly increases management's willingness to engage because it indicates that the
investor shares management's desired time-frame for the measurement
of success. Reciprocal engagement is the vehicle for the benefits of relational investing.10 Management shares information and plans and commits to take seriously the investor's responses; patient capital is not
passive capital. The investor is generally supportive but is prepared to
intervene energetically in a crisis. The base case of contemporary relational investing involves a large single investor who has a substantial economic investment in the firm, most often as equity, who is represented on
the board, and who is prepared to intervene at critical moments to re-

9. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1288-89 & n.33, 1328 (discussing effect of liquidity on
shareholders' willingness to play relational role). If the market in a particular security is
very liquid, then even a sizeable block may not bond a long-term commitment; moreover,
even where the market is less liquid, the issuing company may fear an exit strategy through
sale of the block to a takeover entrepreneur. This is why negotiated large block
investments frequently contain standstill agreements, including positions taken by so-called
"patient capital" funds.
10. See Robert E. Denham, Envisioning New Relationships Between Corporations and
Intelligent Investors, address to the Columbia University Institutional Investor Project,
Conference on Relational Investing (May 7, 1993) (transcript on file with the Columbia
Law Review). Denham is chairman and chief executive officer of Salomon, Inc.
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place senior management or to chart a new direction in the firm's
business."
Institutional investors face practical and legal restraints on their capacity to become base-case relational investors. Institutions are financial
intermediaries which collect and invest funds from diverse individuals
and groups. Because of historical concerns about the concentration of
economic power, individual institutional investors, particularly banks or
insurers, are generally prohibited by law from holding a large enough
block in any particular firm to exert significant influence or to obtain
significant gains from relational engagement. 12 The shifting needs and
investment preferences of the ultimate beneficial owners of institutional
claims also militate against an institution's holding a large, potentially
illiquid stock position or committing to an indefinite holding period in
any one company.
Nonetheless, although no single institution enduringly holds a large
enough block in a particular firm for base-case relational investing, institutions as a group indeed may. Even in today's environment of relatively
high portfolio turnover, the overall percentage of institutional ownership
in many firms is quite stable. 13 This produces some relational possibilities, but the set is constrained by the need for institutional coordination.
Given relatively easy free-riding, institutions will want to adopt low-cost
strategies that may be applicable across many firms. Moreover, institutions are quite diverse, both in their type and in their individual tradi11. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra note 7, at 211-17 (describing relationship of DuPont
to GM in 1920s, and of Warren Buffet/Berkshire Hathaway to several companies, more
recently). Many would see Buffet's intervention in Salomon Brothers after its Treasury
bond market troubles, perhaps saving the firm, as demonstrating the benefits of relational
investing. The pre-1938 House of Morgan is also sometimes mentioned as an example of a
relational investor because of its close involvement with firm management, see Michael C.
Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, Harv. Bus. Rev., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 65.
Professor Garten points out that relational investing such as that practiced by DuPont or
the House of Morgan was not predicated on equity participation only but rather was
supported by accompanying business relationships-supplier-customer ties in the case of
DuPont, and underwriter-issuer ties in the case of Morgan. Thus the old-style relational
investor cared about the stability and growth of the firm, which would protect its business
income, more than shareholder wealth maximization. See Helen Garten, Institutional
Investors and the New Financial Order, 44 Rutgers L. Rev. 585, 590-91 (1992).
12. See MarkJ. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 Colum. L.
Rev. 10, 11, 32-35 (1991).
18. See sources cited supra note 4. Indeed, there is also evidence that institutional
turnover may not be as high as commonly supposed. See Carolyn Brancato & Patrick
Gaughan, Pension Fund Turnover and Trading Patterns: A Pilot Study, Columbia
Institutional Investor Project, Center for Law and Economic Studies, Columbia University
School of Law (Jan. 18, 1991) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (close analysis of
portfolios of two pension funds shows high degree of continuous ownership of securities,
especially for portion of portfolio that is indexed). The average holding period for a stock
in CalPERS' portfolio is 10 years. See Dale M. Hanson, The Long-Term Perspective: One
Institutional Investor's Point of View, Address to the Current Investment Issues Seminar
(Sept. 23, 1992) (manuscript on file with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that
CalPERS' annual portfolio turnover in U.S. stocks is less than 10 percent).
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tions. Public pension funds, for example, have exhibited much greater
willingness to enter the governance fray than have private pension
funds. 14 Institutions of similar type also have different internal cultures
that will, in turn, lead to different behavior in the governance arena. 15
Because of the need to attract widespread support from other institutions
prepared to be at least moderately active, an activist institution will necessarily pursue policies with broad appeal.
A further constraint on the capacity of institutional investors to serve
as base-case relational investors is the difficulty in generating appropriate
incentives for institutional managers.' 6 The principal/agent problems in
institutional manager behavior are likely to be even more difficult than in
the case of a publicly-held corporation. 17 In the case of private institutional investors, managers ordinarily hold infinitesimal stakes in the
funds they manage' 8 and rarely participate in gains and losses because of
assorted regulatory restrictions on performance-based compensation. 19
14. See Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance
Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795, 797, 831-37 (1993); Black, supra note 6, at 827-28.
The conflicts of interest that disabled private pension fund managers have been recently
developed in historical context in Mark J. Roe, The Modern Corporation and Private
Pensions, 41 UCLA L. Rev. 75 (1993).
15. See William M. O'Barr &John M. Conley, Fortune & Folly: The Wealth & Power
of Institutional Investing 230-34 (1992).
16. For further development of this argument, see Edward B. Rock, The Logic and
(Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. LJ. 445, 466-78
(1991).
17. The principal/agent problem is one of those foundational issues that permeates
organizational analysis. A famous anecdote is relevant:
Q: "What supports the earth?"
A: "Atlas supports the earth."
Q: "What does Atlas stand on?"
A: "Atlas stands on the back of a turtle."
Q: "What does the turtle stand on?"
A: "After that, it's turtles all the way down."
The principal/agency problem similarly goes all the way down.
18. Obviously the manager will not be a large investor in the fund itself. But if the
manager is a significant stockholder in the fund's investment advisor, whose profits are
related to size of pools under investment management, then there will be some link
between any action that enhances fund performance-whether positive intervention as
stockholder or good stock-picking-and fund manager compensation. Many significant
investment advisors are private firms (e.g., FMR, which manages the Fidelity group of
funds); many are not (e.g., Merrill Lynch). But even in the privately held investment
advisor, it may be hard to create the right incentives for a fund manager, since most
advisors have organized a stable of funds, and the advisor's profits depend upon the
performance of the funds as a group. (Warren Buffet, who has a substantial ownership
stake in Berkshire Hathaway, is an exception to this pattern.) A better alignment of
incentives might arise if the fund manager invested a substantial proportion of her
personal wealth in the fund, but there seems to be no evidence of this behavior, perhaps in
part because many funds are designed to focus on specific sectors or strategies that would
make them inappropriately diversified for an entire personal portfolio.
19. See Coffee, supra note 6, at 1363-65. In the case of index funds, designing
appropriate incentive compensation is particularly difficult because the gains associated
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In addition, in the case of public institutional investors such as public
pension funds, managers-who may be, or may be selected by, elected or
appointed public officials-have incentives to appeal to the interests of
20
political constituencies.
Thus, relational investing by institutions will probably take on a character significantly different from the base case. 21 Institutional investors
acting collectively are unlikely to develop the resource-intensive reciprocal engagement with a firm that is the hallmark of base-case relational
investing. Instead, the possible stances that institutions might adopt fall
along a range of three rough categories, in ascending order of engagement: the "board structure" position, the "board composition" position,
with corporate governance activity are, by definition, shared with all other index funds, in
direct proportion to share ownership. For managed funds, some scheme of incentive
compensation could be devised for the actual portfolio managers of the fund even if not
for the investment advisor, the corporate entity. That is, the investment advisor could give
a bonus to the portfolio manager who out-performed peer funds, whether through stockpicking or corporate governance activity, and still perceive a net benefit from superior
performance that led to an inflow of investor funds. This inducement to the fund
manager to engage in corporate governance activity is limited by the fact that the same
information that might inform governance often can also lead to a trading decision. The
fund (and the manager through the bonus) captures only a pro rata share of gains from
corporate governance, but realizes 100 percent of gains from trading. See Jeffrey N.
Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1549, 1576 n.83
(1989) (informationally efficient markets not inconsistent with shareholder adoption of
wealth-decreasing charter amendments).
20. See Romano, supra note 14, at 799-820.
21. Alternatively, institutional investors might invest in relational investor funds to
overcome the obstacles to coordination. See, e.g., Allen R. Myerson, Pension FundsJoin in
Turnaround Venture, N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1993, at D1 (describing relational investor fund
that will provide cash and governance involvement to distressed firms). However, a
number of drawbacks suggest that such funds will not solve the corporate monitoring
problem. First, the returns from corporate governance activity by these funds would have
to be substantial to justify the premiums that the sponsors will presumably charge.
Moreover, these funds would be functionally closed-end funds and thus presumably would
be subject to the discount from net asset value associated with almost all such vehicles,
whether or not this discount was recognized via trading. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier
Kraakman, Investment Companies as Guardian Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in
the Corporate Governance Debate, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 985, 1005 (1993). Second, the time
horizon of such funds may not be consistent with relational investing. Existing funds
contemplate a holding period of three to five years, which is more enduring than an
overnight trade, but is hardly the long haul. See Lilli A. Gordon &John Pound, Gordon
Group Inc., Active Investing in the U.S. Equity Market: Past Performance and Future
Prospects 2, 14 (1993) [hereinafter Gordon Group] (describing investment time horizons
and other characteristics, benefits, and risks of relational investment partnerships). Some
corporate governance funds contemplate an even shorter time frame. See Stewart, supra
note 5, at 25-27 (comments of Nell Minow on Lens Fund, which exits on basis of target
return rather than duration). Finally, even if institutional investors may invest in true
relational investing funds, the total of such investments will never amount to a large part of
the portfolio. Thus, we need to formulate a strategy that will work for the institution's
direct equity investments. For an account of the initial experience of relational investor or
"patient capital" funds, see generally Patient Capital Funds: A Novel Approach or Just a
Fancy Name for Investment?, 10 Corp. Control Alert 1 (July 1993).
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and the "policy participation" position. What follows is a sketch of those
possibilities and a brief for the "board composition" position.
Board Structure. The least interventionist stance is the "board structure" position, in which the institutional shareholder focuses its activities
on devising the optimal monitor of management. Engagement at this
level has recently led to calls for a board dominated by independent directors, nominating committees composed of independent directors,
compensation committees composed of unconflicted independent directors (so that CEOs of two corporations cannot serve on one another's
compensation committees), and, the newest trend, the separation of the
chief executive officer from the board chairmanship. The underlying
theory of this position is that a structure that can hold the board at arm's
length from management will make the board a more effective monitor
of management and thus more willing and able to intervene at appropriate moments. An institutional investor adopting this stance would vote
for and perhaps initiate shareholder proposals promoting "good governance" mechanisms.
Board Composition. An intermediate stance is the "board composition" position, in which the institutional shareholder seeks to play a significant role in the selection of directors. This position can lead to two
different sorts of engagement: generic and active.
Under the "generic" approach, institutions press for changes in the
process of director selection or in the selection criteria. This is based on
a belief that small group psychology could dull the monitoring zeal of
even nominally independent directors, so. that it will be important to
make directors feel directly accountable to shareholder interests. This
could lead institutions in a variety of directions, for example, to press for
director nominations from a pool of professional directors, whose reputation and livelihood depend on energetic representation of shareholder
interests. 2 2 Alternatively, the institution might believe that directors with
certain skills or backgrounds are particularly useful as independent directors, such as former CEOs or entrepreneurs or even business school
professors. Institutions might press in a general way for directors of a
particular sort, help develop a pool of potential director nominees, and/
or press for nomination of particular individuals. The important element
here is an institutional role in the selection of directors-whether by
their categorical or individual qualifications-that will enhance the directors' sense of accountability to shareholders, creating not just an "independent" director, but an "accountable" director. Thus the generic
approach is based on a view that monitoring by able directors who conceive of themselves as independent can enhance managerial performance and that institutional engagement can enhance the quality and
22. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 833-92. For an account of how
Lockheed changed its director selection process to take institutional suggestions into
account, see Walter Skowronski & John Pound, Building Relationships with Major
Shareholders, 6J. Applied Corp. Fin. 39, 41-45 (1993).
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independence of such directors. 23 Institutional reliance on this strategy
says, in effect, pick the best directors, make directors feel accountable to
shareholders, and count on them to intervene as necessary.
An "active" approach to the board composition position requires the
institutional shareholder to monitor the performance of the company
and, in the case of poor performance where the board itself has not appropriately intervened, to take steps to change the board. This is obviously a much more interventionist position, since the institutional
shareholder itself must come to a judgment about managerial performance and the performance of the incumbent directors. The institution
could measure performance by objective criteria, such as comparative
stock price performance in the industry or various accounting measures,
for example, return on equity, or it could attempt to engage in more
complicated analysis of the firm's business environment and strategies.
The institution could also evaluate seriously the claims of proxy contest
insurgents as a basis for voting.
Policy Participation. The most interventionist stance by the institutional relational shareholder is the "policy participation" position, in
which the institution seeks active involvement in business decision-making by the firm. This general position has many variants. The institution
might want involvement in a generic set of business issues faced by most
firms, such as designing the most effective compensation system for senior managers or general approaches towards diversification or dividend
policy. Alternatively, the institution might want to be involved in specific
business questions, particularly when the firm, by some performance
measure, is faltering. For example: Should Sears sell off its catalogue
division? Should IBM break itself up into separate companies? Should
GM dismiss the CEO? Should Kodak downsize and spin off its chemicals
subsidiary? This engagement might occur on a continuing basis, as
through regular meetings with senior management or through formation
of a shareholder advisory committee, or the institution might insist upon
it only at times of crisis.2 4 Behind the call for this level of engagement23. The recent activism of current boards at a number of major companies, which has
led to CEO turnover at a number of firms, including GM, Westinghouse, IBM, American
Express, and Kodak, should not alleviate concerns about the true independence of boards
as they are currently selected. In most of these cases, the board's hand was forced by
deteriorating product market results and a significant fall-off in stock prices. The failures
of monitoring occurred in the years leading to the crisis, and there is hardly evidence that
today's boards would intervene at a pre-crisis stage. Moreover, the current mood of board
activism is in part the residue of the takeover movement of the 1980s. This will recede into
memory; the more lasting consequence may be the substantially augmented power for
management to resist proxy battles, which will dampen pressure on the board.
24. As to the potential effectiveness of shareholder advisory committees, compare
Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 6, at 871-72 (likely to be ineffective because of little
information or power) with Rock, supra note 16, at 490-504 (conceivably useful if
convened on ad hoc basis in quasi-crisis situations, but relatively ineffective as general
monitor or general representative of shareholder opinion).
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either to be consulted or to be heeded-might also be the threat to work
25
to change the composition of the board.
Determining which of these three modes of relational behavior
could develop and survive over a long period of time is a complicated
matter, and the normative question is even more difficult. My current
view is that institutions should adopt the "board composition" position
(which subsumes concerns about "board structure").26 Thus institutions
should generally pursue a generic approach of (1) trying to buttress the
selection of especially able independent directors, who will feel accountable to the institutions as shareholders; (2) on occasion switching to the
active mode of changing the board when management (and the board)
fails by important performance indicators; but (3) in general avoiding
"policy participation." This conclusion assumes the continuation both of
the legal barriers to large block ownership by institutions and of significant limitations on performance-based compensation to institutional
managers. This view is based on three important concerns: heterogeneity, competence, and political durability.
Heterogeneity. One major concern about institutional engagement in
corporate governance is that ideas disseminate quickly and that heterogeneity of opinion will too quickly be suppressed. Some important organizational and business innovations will be lost, to society's long-run
economic detriment, and some innovations may be pressed too far. The
phenomenon of large-scale leveraged buyouts in the late 1980s shows
how quickly questionable innovations can spread under existing arrangements. 27 Institutional engagement in business decisions might only accelerate this trend.
This risk, which may arise from any concentration of decisionmaking power, will be exacerbated by the particular constraints on institutional behavior. The legal barriers to large block ownership mean that
effective action by institutional investors will require concerted effort by
many of the institutional holders in the firm. Free rider problems will
put pressure on institutional actors to limit the costs of their relational
engagement. These factors will probably lead to consensus views about
what is to be done (because if there is no consensus, nothing can be
done) and to generic policies (because custom-tailored policies are much
more expensive to develop).
25. Another variant of this strategy is for the institution to put one of its own officers

directly on the board, either as a continuing director or temporarily during a time of crisis.
This is different from the board composition strategy because of the direct engagement by

the institution in the business affairs of the firm.
26. I think it reasonably obvious that a "board structure" policy alone is unlikely to
energize the internal governance mechanisms in an adequate way.
27. One way to understand Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d
1140 (Del. 1989) (sustaining Time management's combination with Warner despite hostile
bid from Paramount that shareholders would probably have chosen), is as an effort to slow
the pace of economic change to provide a chance for assessment of that particular
innovation. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1987.
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Thus constrained, collective institutional action presents two serious
problems for the policy participation model. First, the consensus generic
policy might be the right policy, in the sense of maximizing share values
on average and over time, but might not be the right policy for every
firm. There may be average policies, but there are few average firms. For
some firms, for example, unrelated diversification may actually increase
values.2 8 Tailored decisions by the firm's managers, under the monitoring of an independent board, might increase shareholder welfare beyond
29
the consensus generic policy.
The more serious problem is that the consensus generic policy might
simply be wrong, in the sense that it reduces average share values. If so,
relational institutional involvement in business decision-making will produce "common mode failure," in which the consequences of a particular
misjudgment are amplified because of wide-scale application. s One
year's conventional wisdom on a business policy issue will be the next
year's common fallacy. This year extensive employee layoffs are deemed
necessary to "flatten"managerial structures and to "reengineer" corporate
organizations for higher productivity. Next year we may decide that sig28. This is plausible under at least two scenarios: first, when the business requires a
large component of firm-specific assets that would be dissipated by bankruptcy, thus
making diversification at the firm level valuable; second, when the business is headed by a

person of special skill in managing a portfolio of companies such as General Electric or
Teledyne, two successful conglomerates. See James I Norman, A New Teledyne, Forbes,
Sept. 27, 1993, at 44-45.
29. This problem runs through our conception of the policy bases for legal rules as
well as the optimal voting strategy by diversified shareholders such as institutional
investors. For example, shark repellent charter amendments on average reduce
shareholder wealth, so some may argue for judicial invalidation or narrowing and certainly
advise shareholders to oppose them. Yet averages conceal cases in which the
circumstances of an individual firm may justify shark repellents. This is the
countermajoritarian difficulty in corporate law. Because of the agency problems that make
us suspicious of management's particularized pleading and the costs of a firm-specific
analysis, the generic approach may be the best available strategy. Yet a truly independent
board whose particularized judgments established a legitimate basis for confidence might
produce even better outcomes. See, e.g., James Brickley et al., The Boards of Directors
and the Enactment of Poison Pills tbls. 2-3 (Nov. 21, 1991) (unpublished manuscript) (on
file with author) (despite evidence that adoption of poison pills on average reduces stock
prices, in companies with majority-independent boards, stock prices increase), discussed in
Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence,
39 UCLA L. Rev. 895, 901, 913 (1992).
30. For example, the current agenda of institutional engagement seems to be set by
performance screens, in which portfolios are ranked according to a series of stock price
and financial performance indicators. The poorest performers are then targeted for
various types of action, including requests for a meeting with management or the board
and the threat to file various shareholder proposals or withhold votes for directors. On
this basis the Council of Institutional Investors, representing 86 institutional investors with
$600 billion of aggregate assets, has recently targeted 50 companies as poor performers.
See Ann Yerger, Use of Performance-Based Screening Grows Among Activists, Investor
Responsibility Research Ctr., Corp. Governance Bull. 5-10 (Sept./Oct. 1993). Comparative
performance measures are indeed valuable, but widespread, reflexive application of
policies implicit in the screening exercise could have serious negative consequences.
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nificant support staff is desirable because skilled people, unlike inventory,
cannot be supplied "just in time" and that the demoralization effects of
layoffs outweigh the cost-savings. 3 l Institutions are prone to fads, at least
in investment decision-making, some of which turn out to be wrong.
Consider the "Nifty Fifty" growth stock strategy of the early 1970s, the
reliance on portfolio insurance before the 1987 stock market crash, and
the boom-bust cycles in various parts of the stock market. The consequences of these fads for the allocation of real economic resources has
been limited by the marginal impact of secondary market activity on firm
behavior.3 2 The widespread application in corporate boardrooms of similarly faulty consensus generic policies would obviously have greater consequences.3 3 There already may be too much consensus in American
engagement in
business policymaking. Direct, relational institutional
3 4
trend.
this
exacerbate
only
will
policymaking
business
31. Compare, e.g., Al Ehrbar, "Re-Engineering" Gives Firms New Efficiency, Workers
the Pink Slip, Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1993, at Al and G. Pascal Zachary & Bob Ortega,
Workplace Revolution Boosts Productivity at Cost ofJob Security, Wall St.J., Mar. 10, 1993,
at Al with, e.g., Joann S. Lublin, Survivors of Layoffs Battle Angst, Anger, Hurting
Productivity, Wall St. J., Dec. 6, 1993, at Al and Robert B. Reich, Companies are Cutting
Their Hearts Out, N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1993, § 6 (Magazine), at 54.
32. See Lynn A. Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis
of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 613 (1988).
33. This is not to say that managers, and even professional directors, are not
themselves subject to fads, but that the problems with institutions may be worse because of
their necessary sensitivity to the influence of stock market trends. Bernie Black argues that
institutional engagement will counter the management fad-following tendency and
otherwise dissents from the concerns raised in this paragraph. See Black, supra note 6, at
866-67.
34. This problem may be further exacerbated by the tendency of some of the
proponents of institutional activism to overread the implications of empirical studies on
governance structure or particular business strategy.
Suppose a study shows that, on average, dismissal of a CEO increases stock prices.
Apart from the problem that a sample with a positive mean can contain many negative
cases, and that over time the market may learn to differently value a particular governance
change, it would be a mistake to conclude that if any randomly selected CEO were fired,
the firm's stock price would go up, on average. For firms in the study, a process of
information gathering and analysis, and the application of certain decision parameters led
to the identification of a particular CEO to be terminated. Unless the institution is
prepared to go through a similar procedure, it cannot hope to replicate the average
positive results in a subsequent sample. This may sound obvious, but event studies lend
themselves to this misinterpretation. At most a study of CEO termination will show that it
is possible that firing the CEO will increase share prices. The point is that in the effort to
economize on costs, institutions may be tempted to rely on simple decision procedures:
push for the portfolio-maximizing average governance or business change, or screen
companies by simple criteria, such as return-on-equity performance, by quartile, for
standard prescriptive action. The closer these rule-of-thumb procedures get to actual
business decisions, the greater the likelihood of bad results that will discredit relational
investing by institutions.
Even a board composition strategy is subject to some of the same criticism. The
evidence that independent directors enhance board performance is not the strongest, see,
e.g., Black, supra note 29, at 899-903, which may be at least partially accounted for by
relatively weak definitions of independence. There may be other important variables, for
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By contrast, a "board composition" strategy is unlikely to be harmful
in this way. A consensus, generic policy favoring the selection of wellqualified independent directors will not produce consensus, generic business strategies. If anything, a board composition strategy may embolden
managements to try nonconventional strategies that they have defended
before a genuinely more independent board. A board composition approach tries to foster in directors an allegiance to shareholders rather
than to a specific managerial team; it promotes general standards and
qualifications which may encourage a useful sense of professionalism for
such directors. But directors who may be well-qualified by a consensus
standard will not necessarily share opinions about a business problem. 5
Competence. The second problem with the "policy participation"
approach is the debatable institutional competence to execute such a
strategy. To engage in serious evaluation and second-guessing of management strategies, institutions would clearly have to take an approach to
staffing themselves that differs dramatically from current practice, which
focuses on stock-picking and marketing skills. Alternatively, institutions
could retain consultants to focus on specific problem cases. Under either
example, the degree to which the firm is subject to product market pressure. Insulation
through temporary market power or a large cash hoard encourages board complacency as
well as managerial slack, and, by contrast, product market pressure stimulates board
action. In some circumstances, conceivably, the optimal board is dominated by directors
who have invested a large percentage of their personal wealth in the firm. The concept of
directorial independence is contestable as well. Is an officer of a customer or supplier of
the firm "independent"? Independence in such a case seems problematic because of the
incumbent management team's ability to alter the terms of trade with the related party.
But such a director may also have a particular interest in the economic well-being of the
firm that leads to more aggressive action. See Garten, supra note 11 (old-style relationship
investing supported by business ties).
It is also noteworthy that some of the initial impetus for independent directors arose
from the concern in the 1960s and 1970s about corporate accountability rather than the
concern about corporate performance more characteristic of the 1980s and 1990s.
Corporate law violations in price-fixing and campaign contributions, not to mention
questionable payments abroad to foreign government officials and politicians, raised
serious questions about the internal monitoring systems of corporations. The problem was
that corporations were following profit-maximizing strategies all too comprehensively;
independent directors, it was thought, would halt such overreaching. The takeover
movement provided a new rationale for independent directors, who were to be ostensibly
disinterested decision-makers in corporate control contests. The current hope that
independent directors can substitute for vigorous competition in product or control
markets is the third spin on the idea.
In short, pushing for independent directors without looking for specific
characteristics that have made such directors valuable in other firms may not be optimal.
But the case for independent directors is intuitively strong and the chance that the
addition of able people to a board will lead to worse corporate performance seems remote.
35. Conceivably, the membership of a truly independent director could reduce the
collegiality of the board, which for a particular firm could be optimal. Yet the risk seems
remote that a competent, if independent, director would significantly stifle board cohesion
at a firm where management's performance was sufficiently exemplary to call for support
rather than monitoring.
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approach competence is likely to be an increasing function of cost.
Faced with free rider problems in the absence of some mechanism to
share costs, institutions are unlikely to acquire the necessary competence.3 6 By contrast, a board-composition approach provides a mechanism that injects competent monitors into the firm's business decisionmaking in a way that distributes these costs across all shareholders. Institutions are far more likely to be competent at describing the credentials
or backgrounds of those who would bring a valuable perspective to the
board, and perhaps even at identifying particular individuals who possess
such qualifications. Because directors' fees are paid by the corporation
itself, a board-composition approach alleviates free-riding.
PoliticalDurability. The third problem with "policy participation" is
its long-term political durability. Assume that institutions force a substantial downsizing on a particular firm that results in plant closings and employee layoffs. Any number of politically potent actors who object to this
result-unions, incumbent managers, elected or appointed officialscould raise the cudgel against "monopoly capital." The populist appeal
of such arguments already contributes to the existing constraints on institutional size and activity.3 7 State legislatures and Congress are likely to
36. This is the insight behind Joe Grundfest's argument that institutional investors
should use performance screens to identify problem firms and then simply vote against
reelection of the incumbent board, on the theory that such a no-confidence vote would
precipitate major changes. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No: A Minimalist Strategy
for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 857 (1993). Although this
strategy has attracted some institutional adherents in recent years, in 1993 the number of
orchestrated "justvote no" campaigns was small. See Investor Responsibility Research Ctr.
(IRRC), Negotiating, Limited Use of New Proxy Rules Mark Season, Corp. Governance
Bull., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 1, 3. One problem with the strategy is that it may not satisfactorily
answer the question "compared to what." On possible concerns with using performance
screens, see supra note 30.
The more serious problem with this strategy, and with the related strategy seen in
cases like GM, IBM, Sears, American Express, and Westinghouse of pressuring the board to
replace the CEO of an underperforming firm, is that the intervention comes after the loss
of substantial shareholder value. This illustrates the cost/competence problem for the
policy participation approach. A low-cost method of detecting poor performance, such as
screening, will produce many instances of noisy, ambiguous signals that provide a weak
basis for institutional intervention, yet by the time the signals are clear enough to warrant a
strong measure like firing the CEO, much of the damage will have already occurred. The
hope of a board composition strategy is to infuse the board with a spirit of directorial
independence that would lead to reevaluation of the firm's direction much earlier.
37. See Manhattan Institute Center for Corporate Governance, Forum: How Should
Institutional Investors Relate to Corporate Boards and Management? 63-64, (Apr. 20,
1993) (transcript on file with author) (Remarks of Ira M. Millstein, Senior Partner, Weil,
Gotshal & Manges). The concern about political backlash may already be influencing
institutional investor behavior. A consultant's report evaluating whether CalPERS should
invest in a corporate governance fund organized by shareholder activist Robert Monks
raised this issue. See Gordon Group, supra note 21. CalPERs clearly was concerned, see
Randall Smith, CaIPERs Mulls Stakes in Funds Seeking Changes in Firms' Strategy,
Governance, Wall St.J., Dec. 31, 1992, at A3, and eventually decided not to make the
investment.
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respond to this new outcry, as the history of anti-takeover laws in the
197 0s and 1980s readily illustrates.a8 This argument suggests that institutions will eventually be blocked by political reaction from intervening to
influence firms to adopt certain optimal business policies.3 9 The flip side
of the argument, however, is that institutions adopting a business policy
position may also face political pressure to influence the firm to adopt
policies to serve the interests of some politically potent group. 40 Once it
becomes clear that institutions have direct access to the executive suite,
political groups are very likely to seek to exploit that avenue. Certain
institutions, such as public pension funds, are particularly vulnerable to
that pressure, but the regulatory environment in which any large institutional investor operates generalizes that vulnerability.
By contrast, a "board composition" position should be easier to sustain precisely because the institutions are not assuming direct power.
They are merely playing a heightened corporate governance role in securing the services of able independent directors, who are responsible,
firm by firm, for particular decisions. Even if firms take decisions that
tend to promote shareholder interests over those of other constituencies,
there is no specific aspect of institutional involvement to which the political process can react.
The responses to economic dislocations in the 1980s provide support
for this point. The managerial layoffs and headquarters relocations associated with some hostile takeovers easily became grist for popular outcry
against takeovers, principally because these disruptions seemed the result
of centralized decision-making by a handful of entrepreneurs ("raiders")
and their investment banking co-conspirators. Where no identifiable
group could be blamed for the much more widespread firm-by-firm layoffs associated with general economic change in the same period, public
reaction was quite different: it was marked by malaise (which may have
led to a change of presidential administrations), but not by a targeted
political attack or significant legislative enactment. 4 1 The constituency
38. See Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover
Statutes, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 846 (1989); Patrick S. McGurn et al., Investor Responsibility
Research Ctr., State Takeover Laws (Sept. 1989) (compiling 150 antitakeover statutes
adopted in thirty-nine states); Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers:
Legislation and Public Opinion, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 457 (1988) (reviewing Congressional

proposals).
39. One early sign is the formation by the American Bar Association's Section on
Business Law of an Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Institutional Investors with an apparent
agenda of questioning the appropriateness and accountability of institutional engagement.
40. See, e.g., Leslie Wayne, U.S. Officials in Plea to Pension Funds, N.Y. Times, Oct.
12, 1993, at D2 (Secretary of Labor urges institutions to avoid pressure on portfolio
companies to cut payrolls and to add non-financial criteria in evaluating investments).
41. Congress did pass the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (to be codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109);
however, it was so riddled with loopholes that its practical effect has been minimal. See
John T. Addision & McKinley L. Blackburn, The Worker Adjustment and Retraining
Notification Act: Effects on Notice Provision (1993) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
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statutes adopted at the end of the 1980s may have given boards the discretion to trade off the interests of shareholders against those of other constituencies-protection against centralized pressure-but they also
permitted directors to favor shareholders if they chose-protection for
decentralized decision-making. Thus, taking into account the political
environment in which economic action is situated, institutions will be
most successful if they pursue a strategy that preserves the decentralized
nature of the firm's response to general market pressures. This logic argues for a "board composition" approach, even if agency problems mean
is not as effective as direct
that particular board action in a given case
42
institutional business policy intervention.
The foregoing lines of argument suggest the conclusion that, in their
role as relational investors, institutions should principally pursue strategies that increase their influence over the composition of the board and
the ability of the board to monitor managers. 43 This Article ultimately
tries to show how cumulative voting can usefully augment that influence
and suggests that institutional investors should thus devote resources toward this end. However, before arguing for the revival of cumulative voting, we need first to understand the reasons for its demise. The evidence
suggests two very different hypotheses: one holds that cumulative voting
fell victim to a managerialist race to the bottom; the other posits that
with the Columbia Law Review) (comparison of percentage of workers receiving lay-off
notices before and after passage of act shows little change); Sylvia Nasar, Layoff Law
Impact Is Almost Nil, N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1993, at D1 '(describing studies).
42. This is a localized example of a broader argument that the optimal corporate law
(or legal institution) might not be the most "efficient" law, but rather the law that is most
efficient given the political environment in which it will operate. From a strictly economic
point of view, a regime that focuses solely on shareholder wealth maximization might be
most efficient and thus superior, but if the predictable political reaction to the
consequences of such a regime produces highly restrictive laws, society (and shareholders)
would be better off with a regime that accommodates these political forces. Thus the
optimal corporate law is the second-best legal regime. I develop these themes in a work in
progress, Corporate Governance and the Transition Costs of Capitalism.
43. This is not to condemn recent high-profile institutional activism that has
contributed to several CEO ousters. Where the company has unambiguously failed by
appropriate performance measures, institutional pressure on the board to reshuffle the
management team may be useful, not only for the particular firm's performance, but also
as a general deterrent. The institutions can be thought of as reminding the boards of that
their job is to monitor the performance of the managerial team on behalf of the
shareholders. This is not inconsistent with what I have termed an "active" board
composition strategy, since it focuses on bottom line performance and the board's
monitoring role, and is backed by the implicit threat to try to change the board if it fails to
respond. Far more problematic, in my view, would be pressure for adoption of particular
business strategies, even by a company in crisis. This would amount to policy participation.
Most firms, however, are not in crisis and institutional investors should work on strategies
that could strengthen governance so as to avoid unnecessary crisis (understanding that in a
competitive market some firms must fail or exit). Accountable directors may improve the
monitoring of managers, perhaps leading to better decisions outside of crisis, but also
serving in the appropriate, rare case as a shareholder sentinel to call for more direct
engagement by institutional investors.
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cumulative voting, even if once useful, came to interfere with good governance. Even the negative hypothesis that cumulative voting was a casualty of corporate legal evolution tells us why we might well reexamine
cumulative voting: in changed environmental circumstances, a disfavored trait may play a crucial new role.
II.

THE RI E AND FALL OF MANDATORY CUMULATIVE VOTING

A. The Rise andFall in the Several States
Cumulative voting was not required in corporate elections at common law. Its application to shareholder voting is a path-dependent historical oddity. As part of the Illinois constitutional revision of 1870,
adherents of proportional representation won a major battle to require
cumulative voting for the Illinois House of Representatives.4 4 The principle having prevailed, the constitutional convention also required cumulative voting in the election of directors of private corporations. The

objective was to protect minority interests against overreaching by a majority, particularly in circumstances in which representation on the board
would give the minority the information necessary to police against

fraud.4 5
44. During the 1870 Illinois constitutional convention, a particularly influential
member, the editor of the Chicago Tribune, Joseph Medill, seized upon proportional
representation as a solution to a particular problem in Illinois politics: the Republicans
were in the majority of most of the legislative districts in the northern part of the state,
despite a substantial Democratic vote, and the situation was reversed in the southern part
of the state. This meant that Democrats in the north and Republicans in the south were
closed out of legislative representation and that the legislature itself might be
unrepresentative of the majority of the voters. Medill, the chair of the convention's
Committee on Electoral and Representative Reform, was an adherent of the views on
minority representation of John Stuart Mill, whose recent essay, Considerations on
Representative Government, had attracted significant attention. See generallyJohn Stuart
Mill, Considerations on Representative Government (NewYork, Harper & Brothers 1862).
The committee's proposal on minority representation for the Illinois House of
Representatives-to use cumulative voting in three member districts-was quite
controversial and was submitted separately to the voters, where it was adopted by a
relatively narrow margin.
Medill also successfully pressed the case for cumulative voting in private corporations
with the Committee on Miscellaneous Corporations. As demonstrated by a floor speech
and an editorial in his newspaper shortly before the vote on the constitution, Medill was
spurred by a recent scandal at the Erie Railroad in which a board dominated by Fiske,
Gould, and Lane to the exclusion of minority representatives had looted the corporation.
Thus, as the Committee on Miscellaneous Corporations explained, "we have provided for
the protection of the minority of stockholders of private corporations in the election of
directors." See Wolfson v. Avery, 126 N.E.2d 701 (Ill. 1955) (providing historical account
that emphasizes importance of minority representation at Illinois constitutional
convention); Charles M. Williams, Cumulative Voting for Directors (1951) (providing
lengthy account of the adoption of and debate around cumulative voting that has been
relied upon by all subsequent writers); Whitney Campbell, The Origin and Growth of
Cumulative Voting for Directors, 10 Bus. Law. 3 (1955).
45. The floor speech ofJoseph Medill included the following:
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Once Illinois had set the example, cumulative voting spread relatively rapidly in the late 19th century as states introduced incorporation
as of right, replacing the regime of incorporation by special legislative
charter.46 As shown by Chart I and the state-by-state history of cumulative
voting in Appendix I, seven states had adopted mandatory cumulative voting provisions by 1880, and the number had increased to eighteen by
1900. All but six of these adoptions were by state constitutional provisions. Several of the adopting states were economically very significant,
including Illinois (1870), Pennsylvania (1873), California (1878), and

Michigan (1885). Later in the period, some states began to enact permissive cumulative voting statutes, which permitted corporations to adopt

cumulative voting by charter provision or in the by-laws. 47 Adherents of
cumulative voting opposed permissive statutes, arguing that, if cumulative
voting was desirable, it "should not be at the will of incorporators who
may compose the majority group, nor should a majority be afforded the
We put our money into a stock company, and the first thing we know it is
confiscated by the ring. The men who get control of stock by proxies, which they
coax or purchase on misrepresentation, elect the entire board and then do as
they please. The remainder of the stockholders are in the dark. They have
nobody in the board to watch their interests, to protect against waste,
extravagance or mismanagement, or to take any steps to protect them until it is
too late. This majority having obtained absolute control of the offices of the
company proceed to plunder the stockholders by high salaries, multiplication of
offices, speculating in its money and franchises, and abusing their trusts in every
respect. That this practice is common, is notorious throughout the Union as well
as within this State, and it is growing worse all the time. This provision will
unquestionably afford every stockholder more power of self-protection than he
now possesses. Its object is not to cripple or injure the rights of the majority in
any respect. Their power to control the offices of the company remains intact;
but this is to protect the minority from being plundered and robbed out of house
and home, their stock confiscated and lost for the want of some representative to
look after their interest.
Williams, supra note 44, at 24 (quoting 2 Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional
Convention of the State of Illinois 1666 (Springfield, Ill., E.L. Merritt & Brother 1870)).
46. Through the early 19th century, almost all incorporations in the United States
were pursuant to special charters enacted by the legislature. In the mid-19th century, some
states, particularly important commercial states, had dual systems, under which corporate
status could be attained either by a special charter or under a general corporation act. In
the latter part of the 19th century, these states amended constitutions to eliminate the dual
system; other states added constitutional provisions for incorporation as of right, and both
groups of states adopted implementing corporate codes. See Henry N. Butler, NineteenthCentury Jurisdictional Competition in the Granting of Corporate Privileges, 14 J. Legal
Stud. 129, 138-63 (1985). This transfer to private groups of what previously had been seen
as state power to confer corporate status may account for the framing of some of the
debate over cumulative voting in terms of democratic theory, rather than simply in
economic terms. See infra text accompanying note 142.
47. Since cumulative voting was not known at common law, it was generally (but not
universally) assumed that specific legislative permission would be required for its use. See,
e.g., State ex rel. Baumgardner v. Stockley, 13 N.E. 279, 280 (Ohio 1887); Harlowe E.
Bowes & Ledlie A. De Bow, Cumulative Voting at Elections of Directors of Corporations, 21
Minn. L. Rev. 351, 352, 355 (1937).
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opportunity to withdraw any such grant at its pleasure by amending the
corporate charter or by-laws." 48 Nevertheless, several important states
adopted permissive provisions, including New York (1892), New Jersey
(1900), and then, as part of its move for corporate preeminence, Delaware (1917).
As Chart I shows, after the initial pre-1900 burst of adoptions of
mandatory cumulative voting, a narrow majority of the states that subsequently added cumulative voting provisions chose the permissive form.
By 1945, twenty-two states had mandatory cumulative voting provisions,
and fifteen had permissive. Thus in the 1900-1945 period, four states
(net) adopted the mandatory form; twelve, the permissive. Only two
states permanently switched from mandatory to permissive during the entire period-Nevada in 1903 and Colorado in 1915. (Michigan changed
from mandatory to permissive in 1931 but then switched back in 1937.)
The high water mark of mandatory cumulative voting as a force in
American corporate law was probably the late 1940s. At that point,
twenty-two states had mandatory provisions. The Banking Act of 1933
required cumulative voting for national banks. 49 The Securities and Exchange Commission favored cumulative voting in the reorganization
cases of the 1930s and 1940s.5 0 The first Model Business Corporation Act
proposed by the American Bar Association, officially published in 1950
51
but drafted in the late 1940s, called for mandatory cumulative voting.
Matters changed abruptly, however, in the 1950s. The seven states
that adopted cumulative voting in this period all chose the permissive
form.5 2 In the 1960s and early 1970s the trend was even more pronounced: states began switching wholesale from mandatory to permissive. The 1980s were a rout. Twelve states switched from mandatory to
permissive. By 1992, only six states maintained mandatory cumulative
voting; forty-fourjurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) chose
the permissive form; one state (Massachusetts) did not permit cumulative
48. Bowes & De Bow, supra note 47, at 370.

49. See Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, § 19, 48 Stat. 186 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 61 (1988)).
50. See Williams, supra note 44, at 35; Norman D. Lattin, The Law of Corporations
§ 91 (2d ed. 1971).
51. Model Business Corp. Act § 31, 4 (1950). The first draft was prepared in 1946.

See Cumulative Voting- Developing Trends, 1972 Corp. J. 363, 364 [hereinafter
DevelopingTrends]. A precursor to the ABA's work was the Model Business Corporation
Act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1928, which also prescribed mandatory cumulative voting (§ 28). See Model Business
Corp. Act § 28, 9 U.L.A. 107-09 (1951). The Act was initially promulgated as a "uniform
act," but when the effort at uniformity failed, the Commissioners designated it a "model

act." See id. at 49 (historical note). Cumulative voting was also advocated in the 1920s by
leading business academics concerned with shareholder rights, see, e.g., William Z. Ripley,
Main Street and Wall Street 133-40, 215 (1927).
52. North Carolina oddly switched from permissive to mandatory in 1955.
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voting. No important corporate law jurisdiction maintained mandatory
53
cumulative voting.
B. How Goes the Race?
This remarkable pattern of diffusion and collapse of an innovation
in corporate law54 presents a puzzle: is such a systematic change in state
corporate law evidence of a race to the bottom, the top, or somewhere
else, in the competition among states for incorporations? 5 5 In the case of
the repeal of mandatory cumulative voting, competing hypotheses are
plausible. For example, repeal may reduce shareholder welfare because
of the managerial entrenchment effect; or repeal may enhance shareholder welfare by reducing the firm's exposure to disruptive or rent-seeking activity by a willful minority.5 6
Missing from the available evidence is an "event study" that assesses
stock price movements in firms incorporated in states where repeal occurs to determine the impact on shareholder welfare. I am skeptical
whether such a study would provide useful information in the case of
mandatory cumulative voting. Apart from the particular factors that
make it unlikely that such a study would generate economically and statistically significant results,5 7 such a study might well obscure the historically
53. The remaining six states were Arizona, Kentucky, Nebraska, North Dakota, South
Dakota, and West Virginia.
54. This is in contrast with the one-way diffusion Romano shows for four other
corporate law innovations, Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. Econ. & Organization 225, 233-37 (1985).
55. A representative sample of the debate on this topic would include Frank H.
Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic Structure of Corporate Law 5-6, 212,
220-24 (1991); Roberta Romano, The Genius of American Corporate Law 14-51 (1993);
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on State
Competition in Corporate Law, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1435 (1992); William L. Cary, Federalism
and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974); Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of Shareholder
Choice, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 1, 64-75 (1988) (in the context of stock exchanges); Jonathan R.
Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law,
65 Tex. L. Rev. 469 (1987); Romano, supra note 54, at 225; Roberta Romano, The State
Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 Cardozo L. Rev. 709 (1987); Ralph K. Winter,
The "Race for the Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 1526
(1989) [hereinafter Winter, Race for the Top]; Ralph K. WinterJr., State Law, Shareholder
Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6J. Legal Stud. 251 (1977).
56. Alternatively, on a pure governance level, repeal may, on one hand, deprive the
board of fresh insight that stimulates better corporate decisionmaking; or, on the other
hand, repeal may protect the board from minority disruption that interferes with the best
corporate decisionmaking.
57. The most important reason is that a change in the state law on cumulative voting
often will have no immediate effect on particular firms, because firms in mandatory states
typically provide for cumulative voting in the charter. Thus the event that eliminates
cumulative voting is a separate shareholder vote. Shareholders may foresee that
elimination of the mandatory requirement will eventually lead to elimination of
cumulative voting at particular firms, but the economic significance of the event-likely to
be small, see ElliottJ. Weiss & LawrenceJ. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A
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contingent and firm-specific nature of the question. For example, the
effect of the elimination of cumulative voting in the 1950s, when proxy
battles merely determined board representation and control, might well
be different from that in the 1980s, when proxy battles were sometimes a
substitute for, and at other times an adjunct to, a takeover bid. 58 Moreover, stock price studies tend to focus on large publicly-traded firms, 59
and, in the desire to generate a large sample of firms, a study may ignore
significant differences among firms that may bear on the utility of particular governance structures. 60
Study of Investors' Reactions to "Changes" in Corporate Law, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 551 (1987)will be further dampened by the distance between the law change and the charter change.
That is, even assuming that elimination of cumulative voting for particular firms would
noticeably affect stock prices, see Sanja Bhagat & James A. Bricldey, Cumulative Voting:
The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights, 27J.L. & Econ. 339,341,353-55 (1984),
this seems unlikely in the case of the elimination of the legal requirement.
The other very serious problem is to identify the relevant event day for the legal
change in question. By the effective date of legislation, its impact has been anticipated.
This leads to a technique in which stock price changes around the key moments of
legislative action (assuming they can be identified!) are aggregated, which in turn may
create severe problems of statistical significance. Moreover, the elimination of mandatory
cumulative voting is often part of a legislative package that changes other aspects of
corporate law, ranging from general revision of the corporate code to other provisions
with probable antitakeover effect. For an excellent description of event study
methodology, see RonaldJ. Gilson & Bernard S. Black, The Law and Finance of Corporate
Acquisitions 185-204, 217-19, 221-25 (Supp. 1993) [hereinafter Black & Gilson].
58. As a technical matter, one could break a multi-decade sample into panels of
discrete years, in order to increase the likelihood that common elements were motivating
the change under examination. (But such panels reduce the sample size and thus make
statistically significant results less likely.) Early studies of takeover gains tended to
aggregate cases across many years, an approach which conflated types of transactions that
are quite different in motive and effect. Recent studies are more sensitive to factors of
time and transaction type. Compare, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Richard S. Ruback, The
Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 5 (1983) (strong
conclusions based on aggregating data) with, e.g., Michael Bradley et al., Synergistic Gains
from Corporate Acquisitions and Their Division Between the Stockholders of Target and
Acquiring Firms, 21 J. Fin. Econ. 3 (1988) (more equivocal results from matching bidder
and target pairs and breaking down data into multiple subperiods); see generally Gilson &
Black, supra note 57, at 303-313 (presenting aggregating studies as well as those
partitioning the data set). Moreover, stock price studies measure investor expectations:
stock prices change because of changed investor expectations about future cash flows,
which expectations may (or may not) subsequently be realized. Over time, investors will
learn about realizations as well, which will affect investor expectations about subsequent
transactions of the same type. Studies that aggregate even similar cases across a significant
time period may efface the impact of this learning. See Gordon, supra note 55, at 33-36
(analysis of studies of dual class common stock recapitalizations).
59. Stocks must be publicly traded for stock prices to be readily observable and, since
the event study methodology depends on an efficient market in the firm's stock, the firm
should have a sizable market capitalization and float.
60. Breaking down the sample into subsamples according to some criteria deemed
relevant makes statistical significance harder to obtain, particularly if the effects are small.
In some areas it may be possible, see, e.g., Gregg A. Jarrell & Annette B. Poulsen, DualClass Recapitalizations as Antitakeover Mechanisms, 20 J. Fin. Econ. 129 (1988)
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Rather than undertake such an event study, I have looked at salient
historical factors operating during the two periods of rapid movement
away from mandatory cumulative voting, the 1950s and the 1980s. The
evidence suggests that at both times managerialist motives activated the
process of legislative change: in the 1950s, managers wanted to reduce
the threat of proxy contests which, among other characteristics, seemed
to jeopardize senior management tenure; in the 1980s, they wanted to
reduce the threat of hostile takeovers by eliminating a particular route to
board representation. But notwithstanding the catalytic role of entrenchment motives and the likelihood that in many particular cases elimination of cumulative voting had a negative impact on shareholders, the
heterogeneity of firms and circumstances makes it hard to insist on cumulative voting as a mandatory rule of corporate law. This skepticism is
borne out by an examination of the legislative process in some states,
particularly California, that recently eliminated cumulative voting. Good
(or mixed) things may emerge despite bad motives. Thus this Article's
argument for a revival of cumulative voting is a custom-tailored claim: for
firms of a particular ownership structure, cumulative voting is likely to
improve shareholder welfare.
1. The 1950s. - The attack on mandatory cumulative voting in the
1950s was triggered by a series of high-profile proxy contests involving
major public corporations in which cumulative voting played a conspicuous role. Although never very numerous, the incidence of proxy contests
increased in the 1950s: there were twenty contests in 1952, twenty-seven
in 1953, thirty-three in 1954, and thirty-six in 1955.61 The targets included the New York Central Railroad; Twentieth Century Fox; the New
York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad; Fairbanks, Morse & Co.; Mont62
gomery Ward & Co.; and Libby, McNeill & Libby Co.
Cumulative voting figured prominently in these contests.6 3 In the
course of the struggle for the New York Central, for example, dissident
(segmenting sample before and after stock exchange response, by level of insider holdings,
and by stock price response).
61. See Leland C. Whetten, Recent Proxy Contests: A Study in ManagementStockholder Relations, Stud. Bus. & Econ., Sept. 1959, at 1, 13 n.5. Other counts are
somewhat different but all show an increase over the same period: the American Institute
of Management tallied 11 contests in 1952, 22 in 1953, and 27 in 1954. See Stock Market
Study, Part 3 (Corporate Proxy Contests): Hearings on S. 879 Before a Subcomm. of the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1533 (1955-56)

[hereinafterStockMarket Study] (reportingstudy). The SEC tallied 18 contests in 1952, 14
in 1953, and 22 in 1954. See id. at 1525 (reporting study of exchange-listed firms).
62. See Whetten, supra note 61, at 2; sources cited infra note 63.
63. Much of the foregoing is drawn from Leland C. Whetten, Cumulative Voting for
Directors: Its Origin and Significance, Stud. Bus. & Econ., Feb. 1959, at 1, 6-11; see also
Edward Aranow & Herbert Einhom, Proxy Contests for Corporate Control 240-41,
341-43, 353-55 (2d ed. 1968). A review by Charles Steadman based on SEC records for
the January 1954-March 1955 period shows 36 proxy contests involving 28 companies,
which were evenly split (14-14) as to cumulative voting. Of the contests in the 14 firms
with cumulative voting, insurgents won control in three cases and representation in nine
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Robert Young made the call for cumulative voting a battle cry.64 In the
infamous 1953 contest involving Twentieth Century Fox, after it had become clear that an insurgent group held enough stock to elect a few directors under the existing cumulative voting scheme, the board called a
special meeting two weeks prior to the annual meeting, at which the cumulative voting provision was removed from the corporation's charter
and by-laws. 65 After a 1955 contest in which insurgents won board representation, Western Air Lines, which was incorporated in Delaware but did
substantially all of its business in California, subsequently obtained shareholder approval for elimination of a cumulative voting charter provision.
This precipitated litigation that produced the famous ruling asserting a
on "pseudo-forstate's right to impose corporate governance provisions
66
eign" corporations, Western Air Lines v. Sobieski.
Cumulative voting was also at the heart of perhaps the most famous
proxy contest of the period, the battle for Montgomery Ward. In that
struggle cumulative voting provided dissident Louis Wolfson the vehicle
for his symbolic victory over incumbent Sewell Avery. 67 Although Wolfson and allies held only a minority interest and failed in a bitter proxy
battle to obtain control of the board, cumulative voting allowed Wolfson
to win several board seats. The incumbent senior managers resigned
soon after what was widely seen as a pyrrhic victory. 68 In the course of the
other cases. See Charles W. Steadman & George D. Gibson, Should Cumulative Voting for
Directors Be Mandatory? A Debate, 10 Bus. Law., Nov. 1955, at 9, 20-21.
64. Of course after he obtained control, he opposed cumulative voting on the
grounds of its "peculiar danger" given the stockholdings of previous management and its
allies. See Steadman & Gibson, supra note 63, at 14-15.
65. Tactical maneuvers to limit the influence of cumulative voting in the midst of a
proxy battle are not just relics of a bygone day in corporate law. During the election
contest at Sears waged in 1991 by Robert Monks, Sears reduced the size of its board (from
15 to 10) and thus the number of directors to be elected (from 5 to 3), which raised the
level of support that Monks would need to win a seat (from 17 percent to 25 percent).
Monks was defeated, receiving 15 percent of the vote. This percentage would not have
won a seat on the original board configuration, but as his chances for success dimmed,
some of his support probably melted. See Eric N. Berg, A Troubled Sears Plans to Cut Five
Directors, N.Y. Times, Mar. 14, 1991, at DI; Eric N. Berg, Dissident Sears Holder Fails to
Win Board Seat, May 10, 1991, at DI; Telephone interview withJohn Wilcox, Georgeson &
Co. (Dec. 14, 1993).
66. 12 Cal. Rptr. 719, 728-29 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1961). For a discussion of the
current constitutional status of a state's ability to impose its corporate code upon a
corporation doing business in the state but domiciled elsewhere, see Richard M. Buxbaum,
The Threatened Constitutionalization of the Internal Affairs Doctrine in Corporation Law,
75 Cal. L. Rev. 29, 40-43 (1987); P.John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1985
Duke LJ. 1, 57-61; see also Draper v. Paul N. Gardner Defined Plan Trust, 625 A.2d 859,
864-65 (Del. 1993) (suggesting that California courts are obligated to apply Delaware
fiduciary duty law to Delaware corporation whose principal business activities are in
California).
67. For an account of the contest, see Robert Sobel, Dangerous Dreamers: The
Financial Innovators from Charles Merrill to Michael Milken 16-21 (1993).
68. Wolfson obtained only 3 of 9 seats. Nevertheless, shortly thereafter the chairman,
Sewell Avery, and the president, Edmund Krider, both resigned. See Stock Market Study,
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proxy contest, Montgomery Ward management tried to extirpate "the
curse of cumulative voting"6 9 through classification of the board. 70 Wolfson won a pivotal legal victory
against use of classification where cumula71
tive voting was required.
Cumulative voting came under special attack during the 1950s because it increases the chances of a proxy contest. With cumulative voting
an insurgent can obtain a significant measure of success merely by obtaining enough votes for board representation. In the case where the
insurgent's objective is to obtain control, cumulative voting can provide
the satisfactory consolation prize of board representation, from which the
insurgent can plan another campaign or press for new business strategies.
In the case where the insurgent wants only board representation, in order
to monitor management or to affect business decisions, cumulative voting, until very recently, has provided the only practical vehicle. 72 Cumulative voting also strengthens the insurgent's hand in negotiations that
frequently end, or avoid, proxy contests.
The quantitative evidence supports the theoretical claim that proxy
contests are more likely in firms with cumulative voting. Williams' study
of proxy solicitations during the period 1943-1948 for 2900 firms tracked
by the SEC showed 69 cases of significant election contests. Of these, 41
firms had cumulative voting, and 28 did not. Williams estimated that approximately 40 percent of the 2900-firm sample had cumulative voting,
either because they were incorporated in a state with mandatory cumulasupra note 61, at 1338-39 (Testimony of John Barr, Montgomery Ward chairman and
president). For a further account of the battle for Montgomery Ward, see sources cited
infra note 87.
69. So it was described by James P. Selvage, the public relations advisor to
Montgomery Ward, in a post-mortem. See James P. Selvage, Pirates by Proxy: Guarding
Against the Corporate Raider, in Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions 107, 109 (American
Mgmt. Ass'n ed., 1958).
70. This is because classification reduces the number of directors elected at any
particular annual meeting and thus increases the percentage of votes that a dissident needs
to obtain board representation.
71. See Wolfson v. Avery, 126 N.E.2d 701, 706-11 (Ill. 1955). The weight of
subsequent authority was to the contrary. See, e.g., Bohannan v. Corp. Comm., 313 P.2d
379, 382 (Ariz. 1956); Humphrys v. Winous Co., 133 N.E.2d 780, 788 (Ohio 1956);Janney
v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 128 A.2d 76, 80-81 (Pa. 1956). Classification has in fact played
a major role in blunting the impact of cumulative voting. See generally Leonard D.
Adkins, Corporate Democracy and Classified Directors, 10 Bus. Law., Nov. 1955, at 31,
35-36 (discussing state court cases that address issue of conflict between mandatory
cumulative voting and classification); Richard S. Dalebout, Cumulative Voting for
Corporation Directors: Majority Shareholders in the Role of a Fox Guarding a Hen House,
1989 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1199, 1214-17 (using numerical and case law examples to demonstrate
effect of classification). Wolfson, of course, resisted cumulative voting in corporations he
controlled.
72. See infra text accompanying note 172. A contemporary example of this is a 1991
proxy battle at Cleveland-Cliffs in which a dissident group headed by Tiger Management
placed five directors on a 12-person board and successfully blocked previously announced
plans for a program of diversifying acquisitions. Telephone Interview with Alan Schwartz,
minority director (August 2, 1993).
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tive voting (33 percent) or because they had chosen cumulative voting by
charter provision (6 percent).73 Thus 60 percent of the proxy contest
firms had cumulative voting despite the fact that cumulative voting was
found in only 40 percent of the entire universe of firms. This difference
is statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 74 Williams
also concluded that especially in large firms, the presence of cumulative
voting led to voluntary inclusion of minority nominees in a number of
75
cases.
Williams also reports that a typical contested election in firms with
cumulative voting was a representation contest rather than a control contest and that in a "large majority" of cases the insurgents gained one or
more board seats.7 6 This is consistent with Borstadt and Zwirlein's study
of 142 proxy contests in the 1962-1986 period, which reports that in representation contests insurgents won at least one seat in 60 percent of the
cases.7 7 It is also consistent with Duvall and Austin's study of 67 proxy
contests in the 1956-1960 period, which reports the presence of cumula73. See Williams, supra note 44, at 66-69. This means that by Williams' reckoning,
nine percent of the firms in permissive states had cumulative voting. Compare infra note
93.
74. Z = 3.29. In light of recent IRRC data that suggests cumulative voting was found

in roughly twenty percent of firms by the end of the 1980s, see infra note 115, Williams'
results are consistent with David Ikenberry & Josef Lakonishok, Corporate Governance
Through the Proxy Contest: Evidence and Implications, 66 J. Bus. 405, 414 (1993) (In
study of 97 proxy contests in 1968-87 period, cumulative voting is found in thirty-four
percent of cases (32 of 95)). The inference drawn from Ikenberry & Lakonishok that
cumulative voting increases the likelihood of a proxy contest is also statistically significant
at the 99 percent confidence level, Z = 5.98.
75. See Charles M. Williams, Cumulative Voting, Harv. Bus. Rev., May-June 1955, at
108, 113.
76. This is consistent with Dodd and Warner's study of 96 proxy contests of NYSE
firms during the period 1962-1978, in which dissidents won at least one board seat in
approximately sixty percent of the cases. See Peter Dodd & Jerold B. Warner, On
Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 401, 409 (1983). Of
the 96 contests, 71 were for control and 25 were for board representation. See id. The
incumbents won a board majority in 53 (75%) of the control contests, but of this group,
dissidents won at least one seat in 27 cases (51%). See id. In 11 of the representation
contests (44%) the dissidents won at least one seat; in 45 of the control contests (63%) the
dissidents won at least one seat. See id. These results, which show many boards split
between dissidents and management, clearly reflect the impact of cumulative voting.
These results are also consistent with Ikenberry and Lakonishok's study of 95 proxy
contests during the period 1968-1987, in which cumulative voting won dissidents at least
one board seat in 72 percent of the cases (23 of 32), whereas without cumulative voting,
dissidents won at least one seat in only 41 percent of the cases (26 of 63). See Ikenberry &
Lakonishok, supra note 74, at 413-14. Ikenberry and Lakonishok do not classify their
contests by initial purpose, but it is suggestive that the dissidents under cumulative voting
won a minority representation in 50 percent of the cases (16 of 32), but won all seats in
only six percent of the cases (2 of 32).
77. See Lisa F. Borstadt & ThomasJ. Zwirlin, The Efficient Monitoring Role of Proxy
Contests: An Empirical Analysis of Post-Contest Control Changes and Firm Performance,
Fin. Mgmt., Autumn 1992, at 22, 26-27.
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tive voting in every insurgent-side success in representation elections (11
of 19).78

The increased number of high visibility proxy contests in the 1950s
led to a general debate, including Congressional and SEC hearings in
1955, over the value of proxy battles and the need for further regulation. 7 9 At about the same time, the corporate bar engaged in a sustained
reconsideration of its position on cumulative voting.8 0 In a debate on
cumulative voting organized by the Section on Business Law of the American Bar Association, the objections voiced by George Gibson, a name
partner of the largest firm in Virginia and an eventual chair of the section, are especially interesting: "In a sentence, American management is
of one mind in opposing cumulative voting; most of all, opposing
mandatory cumulative voting, secondarily, opposing the institution of cumulative voting where permitted by statute."8 1 He cited two reasons:
first, the obligation of directors to represent all shareholders, as opposed
to specific groups; second, the need for "harmony and mutual respect"
that would be "endangered by the introduction of minority
82
representation."
The upshot was a redraft in 1955 of the Model Act provision on cumulative voting that replaced the specific recommendation of the
mandatory form with equally recommended permissive and mandatory
provisions.8 3 Thus the corporate bar, which only shortly before had en78. Richard M. Duvall & Douglas V. Austin, Predicting the Results of Proxy Contests,
20J. Fin. 464, 464-66 (1965).
79. See Stock Market Study, supra note 61; John Pound, Proxy Voting and the SEC:
Investor Protection Versus Market Efficiency, 29J. Fin. Econ. 241, 263 (1991).
80. See, e.g.,John G. Sobieski, In Support of Cumulative Voting, Bus. Law.,Jan. 1960,
at 316; Steadman & Gibson, supra note 63, at 9; Herbert L. Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative
Voting: An Anachronism, 16 Bus. Law. 550 (1961).
81. Steadman & Gibson, supra note 63, at 26.
82. Id.
83. In 1955 a provision was added to give ajurisdiction that wanted to adhere to the
Model Act appropriate language for permissive cumulative voting. See Developing Trends,
supra note 51, at 363, 364-65 (citing Model Business Corp. Act, 1959 Addendum of
Revisions, Alternative Provisions and Optional Section: Revisions and Alternative Sections
§ 14).
Another move against cumulative voting was proposed legislation to eliminate the
cumulative voting requirement for director elections in national banks, see 12 U.S.C. § 61
(1989), that had been added by the Banking Act of 1933. The legislation was submitted in
the Senate in March 1954, very brief hearings were held in April 1955 at which only
proponents testified, and the bill passed the Senate. Hearings in the House in July 1956
quickly became tumultuous and extended for five days. An advertisement by an opposition
group in the Wall StreetJournal described the legislation as an act whose effect would be
to "nullify" shareholder voting power and "to entrench existing managements in
permanent power as self-perpetuating dynasties without any adequate check by the actual
owners of such institutions"; the advertisement urged wires to Congress in opposition.
Despite support from the Administration, the American Bankers Association, and the
Independent Bankers Association, the legislation was never reported out of committee.
See generally Cumulative Voting for National Bank Directors: Hearings on S. 256 Before
the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. (1956) [hereinafter
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dorsed mandatory cumulative voting in the initial version of the Model
Act, now began to attack it as destructive of good corporate decision-making. Such a change very likely influenced those states that, in the course
of updating their corporate codes, tended to follow the Model Act as "the
better view" and as the low-cost way to assure that local corporations received the benefit of the most "modern" thinking.8 4 As Appendix I
shows, seven states that revised their corporate law in the mid-1950s and
early 1960s adopted permissive cumulative voting.85 Other forces, perhaps including the threat by local managers to reincorporate elsewhere,
were operating on those states, but it seems clear that the Model Act had
become a way for the corporate bar to reflect and disseminate American
management's views about corporate governance-in this particular case,
86
about the undesirability of cumulative voting.
Judged with hindsight, it seems that managerial entrenchment motivated the effort to roll back cumulative voting in the 1950s. In the cases
that stirred public debate, incumbent management wanted to deprive a
potential dissident of any possible avenue of attack and was able to enlist
the support of the corporate bar to this end. Shareholder welfare was
irrelevant to this management/bar coalition. In the Montgomery Ward
contest, for example, shareholders gained tremendously. Because of a
notoriously conservative investment strategy, Montgomery Ward traded
in the high $40s during early 1954, despite a cash and securities hoard of
$50 a share. Wolfson announced his proxy contest in August and campaigned on a platform of financial restructuring and reinvestment, including a self-tender at $93 a share. In February 1955, when he mailed
House of Representatives Hearings on S. 256]; Lewis D. Gilbert, Dividends and Democracy
187-88 (1956).
84. See, e.g., infra Appendix II (discussing state revision process).
85. By another tally, in the 1955-1969 period, 25 jurisdictions adopted business
corporation laws based partially or substantially on the Model Act, of which 12 adopted
permissive cumulative voting. See Developing Trends, supra note 51, at 365. It seems also
that the elimination from the Model Act of the mandatory cumulative voting option in
1969 put pressure on state legislatures then considering corporate law revision to choose
permissive cumulative voting. See id. at 366. The movement away from cumulative voting
was not to be complete, however. For example, the use of classification to undermine
cumulative voting led some states to require a minimum number of directors in each class,
typically three. See Humphrys v. Winous Co., 133 N.E.2d 780, 788-89 (Ohio 1956)
(discussing such legislative change in Ohio during 1954-55 period).
86. For a general attack on the uniform laws enterprise that offers an interest group
account of the uniform law-making process, see Larry E. Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, A
Theory of Uniform Laws (George Mason University School of Law, Law and Economics
Working Paper No. 93-004, 1993). A sustained interest group analysis of the Model
Business Corporation Act would begin with the fact that the Model Act is authored by the
Committee on Corporate Laws of the ABA Section of Business Law, whose membership
consists primarily of corporate practitioners.
Note also that proposed repeal by Congress in 1955-56 of mandatory cumulative
voting for national banks, see supra note 83, became a salient political issue that resulted in
the failure of the legislation, whereas most state corporate law-making is very low-visibility.
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his proxy materials, the stock was trading in the low $80s. 8 7 None of these
88
financial elements figured in the published debates of the era.
Nevertheless, the overall impact on shareholder welfare of the elimination of mandatory cumulative voting statutes is difficult to judge.
Although proxy battles are, on average, associated with an increase in
shareholder wealth, 89 it would be premature to conclude that elimination
of a vehicle that may increase the likelihood of proxy battles necessarily
reduces shareholder wealth. "Average" effects conceal a range of outcomes that are sensitive to many factors that do not necessarily correlate
with the existence of cumulative voting: for example, whether the proxy
contest is subsequently followed by a takeover bid or by managerial turnover. And the association between cumulative voting and the incidence
of proxy battles is hardly one for one. The more interesting issue of the
comparative statistics of firm performance with and without minority directors, or, more broadly, without exposure to the possibility of minority
directors, remains elusive.
2. The 1980s. - The takeover wave of the 1980s presented a sustained challenge to managerial control and tenure. The threat came
from two different directions: first, from an increased number of proxy
battles, both in and out of the takeover context; and second, from hostile
bids to obtain majority share ownership. Proxy battles presented not only
the direct threat of loss of control but also an increased risk of senior
managerial turnover. As the Montgomery Ward contest illustrated, even
in cases where the insurgent was defeated, senior managers often lost. 90
87. See Sobel, supra note 67, at 16-21. The text above suggests that the general
propensity of cumulative voting to foster proxy contests and a series of high-profile battles
precipitated the turn against mandatory cumulative voting. However, it may be that the
Montgomery Ward battle, in which an outsider was able to use cumulative voting to assault
a citadel like Montgomery Ward, was entirely sufficient. Often the saliency of a single
corporate law case is sufficient to trigger significant change. See, e.g., Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (leading to widespread statutory limitation on director
exposure to monetary damages for breach of duty of care); City Capital Associates v.
Interco, 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988) (leading to
public threats to reincorporate out of Delaware that arguably led to Delaware antitakeover
statute and perhaps to greater judicial protection of target defensive tactics).
88. Conceivably shareholder welfare was regarded as only one of many competing
goals in the 1950s, which I have elsewhere described as "the high tide of benevolent
managerialism that reflected the importance of the corporation to the organization of
social life." Gordon, supra note 2, at 1982.
89. See Gilson & Black, supra note 57, at 931-37 (summarizing studies).
90. For evidence of this general phenomenon, see Harry DeAngelo & Linda
DeAngelo, Proxy Contests and the Governance of Publicly Held Corporations, 23 J. Fin.
Econ. 29, 46-49 (1989) (study of 60 proxy contests between 1978 and 1985: In one third
of cases (21 of 60), dissidents obtained board control; for half the cases (20 of 39) in which
dissidents did not obtain board control, the CEO, president, and/or board chairman
resigned within 3 years of contest, 13 by end of first year, detailed case studies show
significant dissident activity to replace incumbents in at least 75 percent of such turnovers);
Ikenberry & Lakonishok, supra note 74, at 414, 424-25 (study of proxy contests between
1968 and 1987: where dissidents obtained at least one seat (50 of 95 cases), turnover of
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Sometimes senior management was ousted in a subsequent takeover bid;
at other times senior management simply resigned. The proxy battle apparently often served as a signal to external markets, and to the firm's
board, of serious management deficiencies that warranted change. Corporate managers would want to eliminate any mechanism like cumulative
voting that, by reducing the threshold of success, might encourage proxy
contests.
Moreover, cumulative voting was also perceived as increasing the risk
of a hostile takeover bid. The ascribed danger was that "even if [raiders]
are not able to gain immediate control of the targets, board representation gives them access to confidential internal corporate information and
creates the possibility of disrupti[on] at the board level. .

.

.

"91

Thus,

among the standard list of preventative antitakeover measures was elimination of cumulative voting, either through charter amendment in a permissive state or by reincorporation from a mandatory state to a permissive
92
state.
Management's willingness to change corporate domicile to avoid cumulative voting had a significant impact on the decision by several states
to shift to permissive regimes. 93 From an examination of the legislative
senior management occurred in 58 percent of the cases (29 of 50) within two years
following conclusion of contest; where management retained all seats (45 of 95 cases),
such senior management turnover occurred in 23 percent of the cases (11 of 45). For the
entire sample, such senior management turnover occurred in 42 percent of the cases (40
of 95)); J. Harold Mulherin & Annette B. Poulsen, Does A Proxy Have Real Moxie? An
Analysis of Proxy Contests in the 1980s, at 9, tbl. 2 (Oct. 1, 1992) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author) (study of 187 proxy contests between 1979 and 1989: almost two thirds
(64 percent) of contests were followed by change in top management within three years).
DeAngelo and DeAngelo also report that 15 firms of their 60-firm sample were sold or
liquidated either during the campaign or shortly thereafter because of pressure by the
dissidents, and that in seven of these cases, the transaction occurred after the dissidents
obtained minority board representation. See DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra, at 43-44.
91. 1 Arthur Fleischer, Jr., et al., Takeover Defense 457 (4th ed. 1990). The pace of
proxy battles picked up during the 1980s, from a level of 10-13 annually during the
1979-1984 period, to 28 in 1988 and 31 in 1989. Although proxy battles were initially a
tactic separate from tender offers, by the mid-1980s proxy contests and tender offers
became intertwined. See Mulherin &Poulsen, supra note 90, at tls. 1 & 2. Mulherin and
Poulsen report that for a sample of 187 proxy contests between 1979 and 1989, 81 firms
(43 percent) were subject to a tender offer in the period surrounding the proxy contest.
In 54 of the cases subject to tender offer, the bidder was a proxy contestant; in the
remaining 27 tender-related cases, a third party entered. See id. at 6-7. The most obvious
explanation for the conjoining of proxy battle to a tender offer is the need to overcome
defensive tactics such as the poison pill and state law protective options that are in the
control of the target's board.
92. See, e.g., Fleischer et al., supra note 91, at 457-58; 2 Shark Repellents and Golden
Parachutes 265 (Robert H. Winter et al. eds., Supp. 1989). Of the 1,440 companies tracked
in the IRRC's 1989 compilation of takeover defenses, 113 had eliminated cumulative
voting during the 1980s. See Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Corporate Takeover
Defenses 1470-71 (1989) (app. H) [hereinafter Corp. Takeover Defenses].
93. A survey of the Fortune 500 as of 1992 turned up 11 firms that had shifted
corporate domicile to Delaware in the mid-1980s to avoid cumulative voting. The timing
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process in four states that eliminated cumulative voting in the 1980s, California, Illinois, Ohio, and Missouri, it seems clear that legislative revision
was significantly affected by the effort to hold onto corporations that
might otherwise relocate to Delaware. Does this mean that the race was
to the bottom? Antitakeover motives spurred the legislative process: but
for the managerial response to takeover pressure, mandatory cumulative
voting would probably not have disappeared so quickly and totally from
the legislative landscape. It is therefore tempting to identify the elimination of mandatory cumulative voting as another kind of second generation antitakeover statute, 94 which, as the empirical evidence makes
relatively clear, generally reduces shareholder wealth. 95 Antitakeover
statutes clog the market in control that is the engine of the race-to-the
top claim. 96 Nevertheless it does not follow that mandatory cumulative
voting-a regime under which every firm has cumulative voting-is necessarily optimal from the shareholder point of view.
The story behind the California elimination of mandatory cumulative voting is especially illuminating in this regard. Antitakeover motives
seem to have provided a legislative cover for a defensive action by California public utilities against non-shareholder constituency pressure that cumulative voting made possible. Cumulative voting had been a
longstanding objection of large public corporations to a California domicile. In 1976 cumulative voting was described as "the greatest burden of
correlates rather well with the shifts by 9 states in the late 1980s from mandatory to
permissive regimes. The firms were:
Firm
Original State
Year
Atlantic Richfield
Pa.
1985
Clorox
Cal.
1986
Crane
Ill.
1985
Intel
Cal.
1989
Lockheed
Cal.
1986
Nacco
Ohio
1986
Occidental Petroleum
Cal.
1986
USG
III.
1986
Western Digital
Cal.
1987
SeeJeffrey N. Gordon, What is Relational Investing and How Cumulative Voting Can Play a
Role app. I (Columbia University Center for Law & Economic Studies Working Paper No.
97, 1993) [hereinafter Fortune 500 Survey] (Survey of 1992 Fortune 500).
94. One might label it "second generation" because it focuses, in accordance with
CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987), on internal governance
procedures that can reduce the firm's susceptibility to takeover bids, whereas "first
generation" statutes regulated the takeover process itself and were struck down by Edgar v.
Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
95. State "antitakeover" laws reduce shareholder wealth by 1 percent to 5 percent,
depending on the strictness of the law. See Black, supra note 29, at 911-12 (collecting
studies); Romano (1993), supra note 55, at 60-72, (summarizing debate).
96. See Gordon, supra note 19, at 1571-72; MarkJ. Roe, Takeover Politics, in The
Deal Decade: What Takeovers and Leveraged Buyouts Mean for Corporate Governance
321 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993); Winter, Race for the Top, supra note 55, at 1528-29.
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California law."9 7 Firms faced with hostile bids were very blunt about
describing cumulative voting as an important reason for their exit. 98 Nevertheless the legislature remained unmoved. Several large public firms
left California for Delaware in the mid-1980s. 99
The origin of the effort in the late 1980s to eliminate cumulative
voting was a 1987 report of the Corporations Committee of the Business
Law Section of the California State Bar.' 0 0 The lawyers who drafted the
revisions represented mostly high-tech companies, typically smaller public firms, not the large public companies that had changed domicile earlier.' 0 ' These firms were concerned about their increased vulnerability to
97. The Pseudo-Foreign Corporation in California, 28 Hastings LJ. 119, 137 (1976).
98. See, e.g., Susan A. Rose, Comment, Optional Cumulative Voting & Staggered
Terms of Directors: Is the California Climate Warming to Corporations?, 27 San Diego L.
Rev. 467, 479 n.90 (1990) ("reason for reincorporation in Delaware is to prevent The
Limited Inc. from gaining representation on the company's board through the use of
California's cumulative voting procedures" (quoting Letter from Philip M. Hawley to
Shareholders of Carter-Hawley-Hale (July 12, 1984))); see also Lockheed Corp. Proxy
Statement 15 (April 1, 1986) (on file with author) ("One of the major advantages of the
Reincorporation is that Delaware corporate law does not provide for [mandatory]
cumulative voting."); Union Oil Proxy Statement/Prospectus 8 (March 28, 1983) (on file
with author) (explaining proposed creation of holding company structure with publiclytraded entity incorporated in Delaware as permitting addition of shark repellent charter
provisions, elimination of preemptive rights, and elimination of cumulative voting);
Western Digital Corp. Proxy Statement 12 (Oct. 2, 1986) (on file with author) ("In
approving the Reorganization Proposal, the Board of Directors determined to take the
following steps which may have anti-takeover effects: changing the election of directors by
eliminating the right of shareholders to cumulate votes ....").
99. Of the 12 nonutility California-domiciled firms in the S&P 500 as of 1985, eight
had reincorporated in Delaware by 1989: H.F. Ahmanson, Caterpillar Tractor, Clorox,
Walt Disney Prods., Intel, Lockheed, Occidental Petroleum, and Times-Mirror.
By this point, although avoiding cumulative voting was regarded as significant, the
crucial element in the out-migration was California's delay in adopting a statutory
limitation on directors' liability for monetary damages in cases of alleged breaches of the
duty of care, and, in the end, the adoption of a relatively restrictive provision.
100. See Memorandum on Legislative Proposal to Permit Classification of Directors
by Term of Office and Elimination of Cumulative Voting for Corporations with Publicly
Traded Securities (June 18, 1987). Various proposals to amend California corporation law
in response to the takeover pressure of the 1980s were routed through an ad hoc
commission, the Senate Commission on Corporate Governance, Shareholder Rights, and
Securities Transactions [hereinafter Senate Commission], made up of state legislators, state
officials, corporate lawyers, business representatives, shareholder activists, and legal
academics. At least some commission members were persuaded by the argument that
changes in California law "to eliminate the features that corporate managers objected to
the most" were necessary in order to hold as California corporations various firms doing
business in the state. The corporate bar worried that the exit of firms diminished the value
of expertise in California law. State officials wanted corporations with a large California
presence to be governed by California law. Telephone Interview with Susan Henrichson,
Deputy Attorney General, State of California, and State Attorney General Designee on the
Senate Commission (July 22, 1993).
101. Telephone Interview with Ronald Moskowitz, 1987 chair of the Corporations
Committee (July 7, 1992). Note that Apple and Hewlett-Packard were California Fortune
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proxy fights because of cumulative voting.10 2 The legislative debate was
framed in terms of antitakeover implications.10 3 It was also argued that
cumulative voting made a firm more susceptible to greenmail. 1° 4 Despite
the opposition of, among others, the California State Teachers Retirement System and Institutional Shareholder Services, 10 5 the legislation was
adopted in the 1989 legislative session with the goal of making "incorporating in California more attractive." 10 6 This historical account suggests
that the elimination of mandatory cumulative voting in California was antitakeover legislation and may have been part of a race to the bottom.
However, further inquiry reveals a more complicated causal chain
10 7
that suggests that elimination may have served shareholder interests.
The actual political impetus for passage of the legislation was apparently
supplied not by the small high-tech firms, but by California public utilities
that could not exit from the California corporate law regime. At its 1989
annual meeting, Pacific Enterprises, parent of Pacific Gas & Electric as
well as Thrifty Stores, a drug store chain, was surprised by the near success of a labor union leader at winning a board seat. Marshalling support
from employees under an ESOP with pass-through voting, a regional director of the Utility Workers Union obtained 75 percent of the votes necessary (7 percent) to win a board seat. In shocked reaction to the
possibility of a union representative on the board, the public utilities'
managements, which are tied to a California corporate domicile by the
Public Utility Commission, began pushing for the repeal of mandatory
cumulative voting. The repeal measure, which was obtained at the very
500 companies that had not yet reincorporated to Delaware by the time of the legislative
enactment.
102. Telephone Interview with Janice Hester-Amy, California State Teachers
Retirement System (CalSTERS) designee on the Senate Commission (Aug. 17, 1993).
103. See, e.g., Revised Procedure Helps Company Resist Union Official's Drive for
Board Seat BNA Daily Lab. Rep., Mar. 6, 1990, at A-4, available in LEXIS, BNA Library,
DLABRT File [hereinafter BNA Revised Procedure] (legislative assistant to bill's sponsor,
Assemblyman Bob Epple, said "the idea was to make it more difficult to mount a hostile
takeover").
104. Telephone Interview with Art Carter, lobbyist for the California State Association
of Electrical Workers (Aug. 20, 1993). Walt Disney Productions, then a California
corporation, had paid $325 million in greenmail to Saul Steinberg in 1984. See infra note
146 and accompanying text.
105. See Rose, supra note 98, at 490 n.183.
106. See Rose, supra note 98 (citing California Senate Ins., Claims & Corps. Comm.
Report on Assembly Bill No. 1929 (Aug. 23, 1989)), at 490 n.180; see also Richard M.
Buxbaum, Recent Legislation Affecting California Corporations, CEB Cal. Bus. Law Rep.
179, 179 (Apr. 1990) (discussing California Legislative goal of stemming corporate flight to
Delaware).
107. The following account is based on August 20, 1993 telephone interviews with
Richard Damm, Senate Commission staff member, Richard Buxbaum, law professor and
Senate Commission member, and Art Carter, lobbyist for California State Association of
Electrical Workers. Additional facts were drawn from BNA Revised Procedure, supra note
103, at A-4,and from All Three California Electrics Drop Cumulative Voting Under New
Law, Elec. Util. Wk., May 14, 1990, at 19, available in LEXIS, Energy Library, ELUTL File,
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next legislative session, was not high-profile legislation. Most of the legislative actors believed it to be antitakeover legislation designed to retain
California corporations, and the unions, completely unaware of the proposal, made no move to oppose it. It was only in 1990, when Pacific Enterprises proposed to eliminate cumulative voting from its charter, that
unions were alerted to the change. The California State Association of
Electrical Workers strenuously sought to reverse the change in the next
legislative session but was unsuccessful; a legal change that could easily
have been blocked was impossible to undo. In 1990 all three investorowned electric utilities in California eliminated cumulative voting from
their charters.
Thus from the shareholder point of view, elimination of mandatory
cumulative voting in California is a mixed story. Most of the large public
corporations had previously exited the state, so the effect of the change
was in this respect already limited. For smaller, high-tech firms, cumulative voting may not necessarily improve shareholder welfare. For example, vigorous product market competition in the high-tech area may
discipline management in ways that reduce the importance of a formal
mechanism to facilitate shareholder access to the board.' 08 In any event,
the sophisticated entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, and other initial investors in such firms would have had both the incentive and the skill to
custom tailor a control regime that would optimize shareholder value; a
mandatory term seems of doubtful benefit.' 0 9 In the case of the public
utilities, a standard argument is that constituency representation on the
board will reduce shareholder value: The constituent can use its board
position to extract a greater share of the firm's profits (for example, in
higher wages); the very process of trying to negotiate these claims at the
board level will divert management from its primary role; and the multiplicity of claims will complicate the monitoring of managerial performance."10 Thus the change in the law is likely to have had different effects
across firms, with the net impact uncertain.

108. See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu:
Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 Yale L.J. 871,
891-94 (1993) (product market competition may be key to success ofJapanese governance
system); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text.
109. See generally Gordon, supra note 19 (developing arguments against mandatory
rules in most circumstances); Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89
Colum. L. Rev. 1395 (1989) (presenting different positions on mandatory corporate law

debate).
110. See Oliver Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 Yale Lj. 1197, 1206-07
(1984); Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law 20 (1986). Both the positive and the normative
claim are contestable, of course. The German system of codetermination, for example,
puts labor representatives on the supervisory board, presumably to facilitate negotiations
over wages. As it emerged from a U.S. government-sponsored reorganization in 1979,
Chrysler Corporation had a United Auto Workers representative on the board, reflective of
the fact that the workers were, like shareholders, residual claimants.
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In the other states I examined, Ohio, Illinois, and Missouri, the stories seem more straightforward."' States were anxious to "modernize"
their corporate law regimes, and especially to retain large public corporations that might otherwise move to Delaware. Antitakeover motives
seemed to be in the air, but cumulative voting changes were not bundled
with the antitakeover statutes adopted by each state. Thus one can be
relatively confident about the importance of antitakeover impetus, suspicious about entrenchment motives, but still agnostic about the overall
effects on shareholder wealth across the various corporations that would
be freed from the mandatory regime. The case for cumulative voting
needs a theory of shareholder and board interaction that does not generalize across all firms.
III. CUMULATIVE VOTING IN CORPORATIONS
The elimination of cumulative voting on a firm-by-firm basis parallelled the collapse of mandatory cumulative voting in the states. Cumulative
voting was never as widespread among individual firms as might be suggested by the number of states that mandated it, however, because many
firms were incorporated in states where cumulative voting was permissive,
such as Delaware. 112 In the 1940s cumulative voting was found in 40 percent of a sample of 2900 of the most significant corporations. 1 3 By 1982,
after the pressure from proxy contests beginning in the 1950s and from
takeovers thereafter, approximately 24 percent of NYSE firms had cumulative voting.114 By 1989, after a decade of intense takeover activity, of a
sample of nearly 1500 publicly-traded firms, only 18 percent had cumulative voting. 115 A 1992 survey of the Fortune 500 indicated that of the 395
116
firms for which data was available, 14 percent had cumulative voting.
This pronounced downward trend shows significant atrophy in the use of
a governance mechanism.
Has this change served shareholder interests? Notwithstanding management's claims in the course of obtaining shareholder approval, the
empirical and historical evidence is negative: the elimination of cumulative voting in large public firms has reduced shareholder wealth on aver111. See infra Appendix II for a discussion of the history of cumulative voting in these
states.
112. This is not to say that Delaware firms did not often have cumulative voting. Even
after the decimation of cumulative voting in the 1980s, a 1992 survey of Fortune 500 firms
showed that 11 percent of Delaware corporations had cumulative voting. See Fortune 500
Survey, supra note 93.
113. See Williams, supra note 44, at 66-69; supra text accompanying note 73.
114. See Bhagat & Brickley, supra note 57, at 343.
115. See Corp. Takeover Defenses, supra note 92, app. G (sample covering 1,440
firms tracked by the IRRC, accounting for approximately 93 percent of the total
capitalization of the NYSE, the Amex, and NASDAQ). A 1993 compilation reports
cumulative voting in 16% of the IRRC sample. See Investor Responsibility Research Ctr.,
Corporate Takeover Defenses xiv (1993).
116. See Fortune 500 Survey, supra note 93.
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age; managerial entrenchment motives seem to play the dominant role in
the management decision to pursue elimination of cumulative voting.
This evidence supports the argument that a revival of cumulative voting
by institutional investors for appropriately selected large public firms
would increase shareholder welfare, but is not itself dispositive: Cumulative voting may have a different impact on shareholder welfare in an era
of frequent hostile takeovers than at a time of more conventional shareholder activity.
In seeking to eliminate cumulative voting, managements have offered shareholders "good governance" reasons that, if true, should lead
to an increase in shareholder welfare. In a 1992 survey of Fortune 500
firms, I obtained twenty-five proxy statements of firms that eliminated cumulative voting at some point in their corporate lives. 17 The most common justification found in this sample was a double-barreled attack on
the principle and consequences of minority board representation: directors "should represent all shareholders, rather than the interests of a special constituency, and . . .the presence on the Board of one or more
director representing such a constituency could disrupt and impair the
118
efficient management of the Corporation."
Because the elimination of cumulative voting in a specific firm ordinarily requires shareholder approval, 119 a stock price study can track the
empirical question of shareholder welfare. Despite the "good governance" argument, the empirical evidence is that the recent elimination of
cumulative voting in the large public firm has reduced shareholder welfare. Bhagat and Brickley studied NYSE firms in the 1962-82 period that
eliminated cumulative voting (nineteen firms) or took other measures
(such as classification of the board) that reduced the effect of cumulative
voting (107 observations, some in the same firm),12° They found that
elimination of cumulative voting reduced shareholder wealth by 1.57 per117. I sent the entire group a questionnaire. I obtained 333 responses. For an
additional 62 firms I was able to supplement my survey results with information from the
Institutional Investor Research Center, especially from Corp. Takeover Defenses, supra
note 92. Of the 395 firms in my sample, 56 had cumulative voting and 36 had eliminated
cumulative voting. See Fortune 500 Survey, supra note 93.
118. Lockheed Corp., Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement 15-16 (Apr. 1,
1986) (on file with author). This is also the most common objection raised to shareholder
proposals in favor of cumulative voting.
119. Firms can eliminate cumulative voting in four ways, the three most common of

which require a shareholder vote. Corporations domiciled in mandatory jurisdictions can
reincorporate in a permissive jurisdiction under a charter that provides for straight voting.
Corporations in permissive states can amend their charter to eliminate cumulative voting.
In states that shift from mandatory to permissive cumulative voting, corporate action
requiring shareholder vote is usually necessary, either to opt out of the mandatory regime
or to eliminate a charter provision that tracked the statutory mandate. In a less common
scenario, in some states, such as Missouri, the board acting alone through a bylaw

amendment can eliminate cumulative voting if it was prescribed only in the firm's bylaws
and if the board otherwise has the power to amend the bylaws. See Appendix I.
120. See Bhagat & Brickley, supra note 57, at 348-50.
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cent on average and that all measures that reduced its effectiveness (including elimination) reduced shareholder wealth by 0.88 percent on
average. 12 1 Although they come from one study only, these results are
economically significant
In understanding the motives for the elimination of cumulative voting and the likely effect, it is illuminating to consider the historical context in which large public firms have raced to make this governance
change. Firms rarely implement good governance strategies in a vacuum.
Efforts to eliminate cumulative voting often seemed driven by the fear of
a specific takeover effort in which cumulative voting could play a role or,
especially in the 1980s, were initiated as a barricade against any potential
raider.' 22 A few examples give the flavor. In 1964, for example, Quaker
State Oil Refining Corporation successfully moved to eliminate a cumula121. These results were statistically significant at or above the 95% confidence level.
See id. at 354. Actually, at least 52 firms eliminated cumulative voting during the period,
but the analysis was performed on a "clean" sample of 19 firms, which was screened to
eliminate possibly confounding events, such as adoption of an employee compensation
pension plan. See id. at 349-50.
The claim that shareholders would vote for a governance change that reduced
shareholder value, and a study that purports to show this, seem at first glance paradoxical.
The usual explanation is in terms of management's control over the firm's proxy
machinery and the collective action problems associated with shareholder voting. See,
e.g., Gordon, supra note 19, at 1573-80.
122. Ironically, cumulative voting has also been used tactically to forestall a raider. In
1964, The B.F. Goodrich Co., the subject of a possible hostile takeover bid by Northwest
Industries, both classified its board and adopted cumulative voting to discourage the
offeror by delaying its control over the board. See The B.F. Goodrich Co., Notice to
Stockholders and Proxy Statement 5 (Feb. 21, 1969) (on file with author); Telephone
Interview with Joan Taffi, Counsel, The B.F. Goodrich Company (July 7, 1993). With a
classified board, the purchaser of a majority but not a supermajority of the corporation's
stock might have to wait three years (assuming three classes) to attain control of the board.
The takeover threat vanished over the ensuing year and the company immediately
eliminated cumulative voting. See The B.F. Goodrich Co., Notice to Stockholders and
Proxy Statement 2-3 (Mar. 13, 1970) (on file with author).
More recently various firms have adopted "contingent" cumulative voting to
strengthen the antitakeover effect of board classification. Straight voting applies until a
shareholder reaches a trigger point of stock ownership, at which point other shareholders
may vote cumulatively. The effect is the same as that achieved by the temporary adoption
of cumulative voting by B.F. Goodrich, although in this case the temporary effect is
embedded into the charter. This device rejects cumulative voting except in the case where
it can be employed as a management entrenchment tactic. See Institutional Shareholder
Services, Inc., The ISS Proxy Voting Manual 174-75 (2d ed. 1991). The Fortune 500
survey, supra note 93, shows that firms that have adopted this device include Dover Corp.,
Harris Corp., International Multifoods, Martin Marietta, and Maxus Energy Corp.
Maxus adopted contingent cumulative voting, along with a series of other antitakeover
measures, in 1985 to fend off a hostile bid from Occidental Petroleum (Maxus was then
known as Diamond Shamrock Corp.). See Letter from Lynne Ciuba, Counsel, Maxus
Energy Corp., to Jeffrey Gordon, Professor of Law, Columbia School of Law (July 15, 1993)
(on file with author). These measures obviously had only limited effect, since the company
went through a major restructuring in 1987 in response to a hostile bid from Mesa
Petroleum (T. Boone Pickens). See Diamond Shamrock Corp., Notice of Annual Meeting
and Proxy Statement 1-2 (Apr. 3, 1987) (on file with author).
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tive voting charter provision in response to the board's discovering "that
a stockholder has recently been acquiring a substantial holding in the
Company and may be in a position in the future through cumulative voting to gain a seat on the Board." 123 To assuage possible shareholder objection, the cumulative voting proposal was bundled with a two-for-one
stock split, which was then commonly thought a desirable corporate development. In October 1987, Gencorp held a special meeting to eliminate cumulative voting, following an effort at the previous annual
124
meeting by the Gabelli Group to invoke it to elect a director.
(Gencorp successfully rejected Gabelli's effort, on the ground of insufficient notice.) 125 In February 1990, as previously described, Pacific Enterprises, at a special meeting, eliminated cumulative voting following the
almost-successful campaign by a labor union official to win a board seat.
The company anticipated "a more extensive election contest by individuals supported by the union" in 1990 and explained that the elimination of
126
cumulative voting would make their election more difficult.
The most important recent example of elimination of cumulative
voting in response to a specific takeover threat was Gulf Oil's
reincorporation from Pennsylvania to Delaware to try to fend off Boone
Pickens' efforts to force a restructuring. 12 7 Pickens and his partners began buying Gulf stock in August 1983, ultimately acquiring more than 13
percent, as part of a stated objective to force Gulf to set up an oil royalty
trust to pass production profits tax-free to shareholders. As part of its
counterstrategy, Gulf called a special shareholder meeting in December
to approve the reincorporation, fearing that, under the existing cumulative voting provisions in its charter, Pickens could elect three directors,
push for his plan from the inside, and eventually force Gulf to buy his
stock at a premium.' 2 8 Gulf's reincorporation proposal passed by a bare
123. Quaker State Oil Refining Corp., Notice of Special Meeting of Stockholders and

Proxy Statement 3 (July 9, 1964) (on file with author).
124. See Gencorp Inc., Notice of Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement 11-12 (Oct.

13, 1987) (on file with author).
125. See id. at 11. Before the annual meeting, Gencorp was the subject of a hostile
takeover bid that was eventually withdrawn after the company undertook a leveraged
restructuring. See id. at 14-15.
126. Jeffrey T. Cobb, Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Corporate Governance
Background Report: Cumulative Voting, Corp. Governance Dig., Feb. 5, 1990, at B-i, B-4
[hereinafter IRRC Background Report B] (quoting management proxy statement). Note
that both Gencorp and Pacific Enterprises called special meetings to eliminate cumulative
voting prior to the next annual meeting, presumably to squelch an election contest that
would bring further scrutiny of management's policies and control.
127. Accounts of the Gulf battle are provided by Sobel, supra note 67, at 140-46
(1993); Gulf Oil Corp.-Takeover, Harv. Bus. Sch. Case No. 9-285-053 (1984).

128. See Tim Metz et al., Future of Gulf Oil Hinges on Proxy Fight Led by Mesa
Chairman, Wall St. J., Nov. 2, 1983, at Al, A18; see also Gulf Oil Corp., Notice of Special
Meeting of Shareholders and Proxy Statement/Prospectus 7 (Oct. 26, 1983) (on file with
author) ("One of the immediate effects and, in the view of the Board of Directors, one of

the principal advantages of the Reorganization results from the fact that Delaware law does
not provide for cumulative voting in the election of directors (unless the certificate of
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majority, Pickens made a partial tender, and eventually Gulf management
sold the firm to Chevron, which outbid a management buyout
proposal. 12 9
The raid on Gulf seems to have galvanized efforts to eliminate cumulative voting. One factor that distinguished Gulf from other major oil
companies was the relative vulnerability that cumulative voting apparently
created. Cumulative voting invited Pickens' initial gambit to seek board
representation; but for cumulative voting, he might have looked elsewhere, and so, at the far edge of the causal chain, but for cumulative
voting Gulf would have remained independent. 130 In short, cumulative
voting made it easier for a minority stakeholder-who might not have
been able to finance a bid for a majority of the stock-to put a company
in play. The prudent corporate manager would want to eliminate this
exposure.
Implementation of such risk-averse strategies led, in the 1980s, to an
unprecedented wave of charter amendments and reincorporations to
eliminate cumulative voting, even at the largest firms, since the activity of
takeover entrepreneurs like Pickens revealed that size alone was not an
adequate takeover defense. My survey of the 1992 Fortune 500 showed a
relative smattering of cumulative voting eliminations in the 1960s (five in
the decade) and the 1970s (two in the decade) but a torrent beginning in
1983 (27 in the ensuing decade). A recent study by the Investor Responsibility Research Center of a nearly 1500-firm sample shows a similar pattern: after relatively rare eliminations of cumulative voting in the 1970s
and early 1980s, many firms (139) eliminated cumulative voting in the
1983-92 period, a period of unprecedented activity in the market for corporate control.
TABLE I

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992

Fortune 500
2
2
3
6
5
3
2
2
0
2

IRRC 1500
7
6
21
19
25
16
10
20
6
9

incorporation otherwise provides, which it does not in the case of the Holding
Company).").
129. See Gulf Oil Corp. - Takeover, supra note 127.
130. I owe this suggestion to Steven KAplan.
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The pattern revealed in Table I suggests that takeover lawyers were
giving firms the same advice: eliminate cumulative voting. 31 ' Whatever
the general governance issues raised by cumulative voting, the control
threat that it apparently entailed was dispositive. Thus the historical pattern is consistent with the empirical evidence that the recent wave of cumulative voting eliminations served management's interests more than
shareholders'.
Nevertheless, the value of cumulative voting as a governance reform
for the 1990s is still open for debate. The evaluation of cumulative voting
throughout much of the 1970s and especially the 1980s included a worried assessment of its impact on a firm's susceptibility to a hostile takeover
bid. As an empirical matter, the elimination of cumulative voting played
like a shark repellent charter amendment, which commonly reduces
shareholder wealth.' 3 2 In light of changes in the legal and financial
framework that make hostile takeovers much harder to mount in the

1990s, 1 33 cumulative voting must now be evaluated principally for its ef-

fect upon the governance of a firm that is unlikely to undergo a control
transaction. In other words, the Bhagat & Brickley study collapses arguably different variables: the value of cumulative voting as a means to enhance capital market pressure on the firm and as a means to improve the
firm's internal governance mechanism.' 3 4 A case for the revival of cumulative voting for the large public firm must attend to current historical
circumstances, in which the governance question is key. To that argument we now turn.
IV. THE REviVAL OF CUMULATIVE VOTING
A. A New Rationale
An argument for a revival of interest in cumulative voting has several
burdens to overcome. Mandatory cumulative voting, which fifty years ago
was embraced by twenty-two states, including several major commercial
states, has fallen into great disfavor, finding only six remaining adherents,
none of which is a major commercial state.13 5 Nor do corporations tend
to use the option in permissive states: cumulative voting is increasingly
131. See, e.g., Fleischer et al., supra note 91, at 457-58.
132. See Gilson & Black, supra note 57, at 621-26 (summarizing studies).
133. See Gordon, supra note 2, at 1931-32.
134. Bhagat & Brickley supply some limited evidence that cumulative voting will
indeed have value as a governance mechanism in the large public firm. Of their 19-firm
sample of firms eliminating cumulative voting, they identify seven firms that exhibited no
evidence of a looming proxy battle or takeover bid in the two-year period prior to the event
date, and find an average effect on shareholder wealth of negative 2.01 percent; six of the
seven firms show negative returns; one, no change. See Bhagat & Brickley, supra note 57,
at 356-57. The sample is too small to draw any strong conclusions. See also infra note

147.
135. See supra text accompanying notes 50-53.
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absent from the governance structure of large public corporations.' 3 6
The plausibility of cumulative voting may have been undermined by the
quixotic efforts of a small band of individual shareholders who fought for
its reinstatement in an era of its widespread elimination. Ever since the
1950s, the major public proponents of cumulative voting have been the
Gilbert brothers, who annually present such shareholder proposals at
many firms arguing that minority representation is an essential feature of
shareholder democracy. 137 The repeated failure of these proposals and
the absence of significant public support from the academic or activist
institutional investor community has somewhat discredited cumulative
voting as an important corporate governance reform.
The more significant burden is the intellectual one. One possible
reason that cumulative voting has not been seriously examined for a generation is that the debate that raged in the 1950s seems to have been won
by its opponents. Cumulative voting took hold in nineteenth and early
twentieth century American corporate law for two reasons: an ideological
belief in minority representation in legislative bodies, which was carried
over to the boards of directors, and a functional concern about the vulnerability of minorities to exploitation by overreaching majorities, especially in light of the difficulties that public shareholders faced in
obtaining information about the firm. By the 1950s the original functional explanations had lost much of their force. Many of the federal
securities laws adopted in the 1930s and 1940s aimed directly at the shady
practices of nineteenth century corporate predation, including fraud in
the issuance of securities and fraud in obtaining proxies, and maintenance of certain abusive holding company structures. Moreover, new
state statutes gave shareholders some access to corporate books and
records; more importantly, the continuous disclosure requirements
under the 1934 Securities Exchange Act gave shareholders access to accurate, timely corporate information that had previously been available only
to a director. The Securities Exchange Commission took a vigorous enforcement role in expounding the disclosure system and in policing
against financial fraud. In addition, state law fiduciary rules on self-dealing by corporate insiders were toughened. 138 Express and implied private rights of action under the federal securities laws gave public
shareholders additional protection against management depredations.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 113-116.
137. For a comprehensive statement of their views, see Lewis D. Gilbert, Dividends
and Democracy 181-89 (1956). The Investor Responsibility Research Center's checklist of
shareholder proposals offered during the 1993 proxy season shows 37 proposals calling for
the reintroduction of cumulative voting, 28 of which (75 percent) were attributed to the
Gilberts. See Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Checklist of 1993 Shareholder
Proposals, Corp. Governance Bull., May-June 1993, at 28, 28-38. Lewis Gilbert died in
December 1993.
138. See Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees?: Conflict of Interest and
Corporate Morality, 22 Bus. Law. 35 (1966) (reaction to abuses produced per se
prohibitions by 1880, which were somewhat relaxed in ensuing decades).
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The opponents of cumulative voting could also point to ways in
which cumulative voting might interfere with optimal corporate function,
especially in the large public corporation. A minority stockholder could
insist on a board seat, and, depending on his disposition, reduce the
board's effectiveness. Instead of an effective working group, the board
could become a debating forum. More seriously, a minority stockholder
might use board access and the threat of disruption to hold up the corporation for greenmail, 3 9 or conceivably to obtain access to competitively
valuable information. In general, as Williams put it, cumulative voting
can be seen as meaning "the election of directors who are by their nature
partisans of particular interest groups; and the role of a partisan on the
board of directors is inherently inconsistent with the proper function of a
140
director."
Finally, as a matter of theory, the corporate board seems a poor
venue for the play of different notions of representative democracy
among a shareholder electorate. Unlike a government, the corporation
has a limited function under the constraints of a regime of profit and
loss. Unlike citizens of a state, shareholders of a public firm can readily
exit through the stock market. In the case of a close corporation, where
exit is limited, it may be, as the opponents of cumulative voting argued,
that specifically tailored shareholder agreements to cover governance or
buyouts and involuntary dissolution statutes, are superior to cumulative
voting. 14 ' In general "shareholder democracy" borders on conceptual incoherence, the phrase a virtual oxymoron. Both straight voting and cumulative voting link voting power to the number of shares owned; both
42
systems of corporate voting aggregate wealth, not persons or interests.1
139. It is put this way in the most convincing anti-cumulative voting piece of the 1950s
debate:
The "raider" is pictured as using cumulative voting to elect a minority of the
directors either (i) as a first step toward eventually electing a majority of the
directors and wresting control from a dedicated and successful management in
order to carry out his personal designs; or (ii) as a means of pressuring that
management, through harassing conduct and threats in and out of directors
meetings, into taking the action demanded by the "raider" at the expense of the
majority stockholders. Such action might take the form of acquiring some
property in which the "raider" is interested, declaring unwise dividends or other
action to cause a temporary rise in the market price of the stock so that he can
take a profit at capital gain rates, or the corporation buying out his shares at an
exorbitant price.
Sturdy, supra note 80, at 550; see also Ralph E. Axley, The Case Against Cumulative
Voting, 1950 Wis. L. Rev. 278, 283. Courts did not police such potential uses of cumulative
voting. See Chicago Macaroni Mfg. Co. v. Boggiano, 67 N.E. 17 (Ill. 1903); Tomlin v.
Farmers & Merchants Bank, 52 Mo. App. 430 (Ct. App. 1893).
140. Williams, supra note 75, at 112.
141. See Sturdy, supra note 80, at 556-65.
142. For a justification of shareholder voting per share rather than per capita, see
Gordon, supra note 6, at 359 (noting avoidance of exploitation of economic majority by
numerical majority, and increased likelihood of correct shareholder decision-making
because shareholder incentives to collect and analyze information increase with economic

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:124

It is hard to take seriously the deontological equality-based arguments
that underlie much democratic theory in a debate about cumulative voting in corporate law. 143 Cumulative voting, like most of corporate law,
should rise or fall on functional arguments about its usefulness in secur44
ing the highest possible total return from corporate economic activity.1
In particular, cumulative voting should be evaluated on its capacity to
enhance management's accountability to shareholders.
The rise and fall of cumulative voting is not, however, simply the
result of an evolutionary process in which a dysfunctional adaptation was
eventually rejected. For some time cumulative voting has been a remedy
in search of a problem. The base case that gave cumulative voting its
legitimacy was the firm in which discrete minority interests faced a cohesive majority. The debates in the 1870s posed the hypothetical of a 49
percent shareholder facing a 51 percent shareholder; the same hypothetical was posed in Congressional debates in the 1950s. 145 Under these conditions one might worry about possible oppression of the minority from a
majority-only board. But as Berle and Means reported in 1932, the actual
stake and potential impact on outcome). But see David L. Ratner, The Government of
Business Corporations: Critical Reflections on the Rule of "One Share, One Vote," 56
Cornell L. Rev. 1, 20-21 (1970) (arguing that controlling shareholder will use power to
exploit public shareholders).
143. See, e.g., John Rawls, Political Liberalism XIV (1993); Amy Gutmann, Liberal
Equality (1980); Bruce Ackerman, Social Justice in the Liberal State (1980); Ronald
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible
Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 893 (1990). Moreover, shareholders are ordinarily
assumed to share the same goal-the maximization of share price, see infra note 151.
Thus the important arguments for and against cumulative voting in the political realm,
where voters have very different objectives, will ultimately be quite different than in the
corporate realm. See, e.g., Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Quest for Political
Equality, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1413 (1991) (discussing the need to ensure meaningful minority
interest representation at both electoral and legislative stages of political process); Lani
Guinier, The Representation of Minority Interests: The Question of Single-Member
Districts, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1135 (1993) (arguing for increased emphasis on voter
participation and choice, and stressing importance of proportionality as means of
increasing minority interest representation); Akhil R. Amar, Note, Choosing
Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 Yale L.J. 1283, 1300-03 (1984) (discussing
advantages of lottery voting versus cumulative voting in securing effective proportional
representation); see generally Douglas W. Rae, The Political Consequences of Electoral
Laws 31-46 (1967) (examples of different cumulative voting methods used in Western
European nations).
144. This is not necessarily to embrace a shareholder wealth maximization standard as
the only objective of corporate law. The question of the distribution of the surplus of
economic activity is different from the question of the conditions under which that surplus
will be maximized. See supra note 2. Moreover, society may well situate "corporate law"
within a system that constrains profit maximization or gives voice in corporate governance
to interests other than shareholder interests. The rules of corporate law under any such
system should be evaluated in functional terms, not on the basis of a priori theory.
145. See Williams, supra note 42, at 28-29 (quoting 19th century debates in Idaho and
Pennsylvania); House of Representatives Hearings on S. 256, supra note 83, at 37
(statement of Fred Walker, director of First National Bank of Arlington, Virginia).
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distribution of share ownership meant that in many large public firms,
there was no majority; ownership was separated from control.
In the large public corporation there was no face-off between majority and minority interests; rather, management was the party on the other
side. Thus the potential role of cumulative voting changed, from giving a
minority a voice in a majority-dominated firm to giving a minority a voice
in a management-dominated firm. This led to a significant problem.
Management's control, because it rested only on the proxy machinery
and on the majority's apathy, seemed at risk in such a confrontation. Because a tenacious minority could do real damage to management's position, management would face the temptation to accede to various rentextraction proposals that a minority might present. In short, in the absence of a majority check on minority power and without adequate monitoring of management by the majority, the minority's power under a
cumulative voting regime made the firm vulnerable to hold-up.
Cumulative voting enhanced the potential influence of a cohesive
minority, which, as contemporary public choice theory makes us aware,
faces a lower cost of organization than a diffuse majority. In the context
of the public corporation, a rent-seeking minority could use that power to
extract private gains. Indeed, the presence of cumulative voting might
conceivably encourage the formation of rent-seeking minority blocs, as
the returns from minority ownership positions increased. For example, a
potential greenmailer would gain additional leverage in a firm with cumulative voting, because his minority stake could provide immediate
146
board representation.
146. In the Pickens/Gulf Oil contest, see supra text accompanying notes 127-129,
"Gulf insiders [were] particularly worried that without the switch [the elimination of
cumulative voting following upon the reincorporation of Gulf from Pennsylvania to
Delaware] Mr. Pickens could win a seat on the board and make so much trouble... that
Gulf would be forced to buy the group's stock at a multimillion-dollar premium." Metz et
al., supra note 128, at A18. Although Pickens had previously accepted greenmail, he did
not accept it in the Gulf contest, even though it was offered. See Sobel, supra note 67, at
140-46. One of the arguments made for the repeal of mandatory cumulative voting in
California was that it would reduce firms' vulnerability to greenmail. Walt Disney
Productions, for example, was a California corporation at the time of the greenmail
payment to the Saul Steinberg group. But see Heckmann v. Ahmanson, 214 Cal. Rptr. 177,
182-83 (Cal. App. 1985) (limiting corporation's ability to pay greenmail in Disney
litigation). Disney reincorporated in Delaware in 1987.
Other firms with cumulative voting that paid greenmail include: General Host, a New
York corporation that paid to Clabir, see Michael Bradley & L. Macdonald Wakeman, The
Wealth Effects of Targeted Share Repurchases, 11 J. Fin. Econ. 301, 310 n.3 (1983); and
Chicago Rivet and Machine Company, a Michigan corporation that paid to dissidents, see
DeAngelo & DeAngelo, supra note 90, at 53. Nevertheless the incidence of greenmail was
sufficiently widespread in firms without cumulative voting that it would be hard to make an
empirical case that cumulative voting made a particular firm a greenmail target. Pickens,
for example, obtained greenmail from Superior Oil, a California corporation, but also
from Phillips Petroleum, which did not have cumulative voting. In theory a firm could
adopt an anti-greenmail charter amendment, but drafting an appropriate provision is
complicated, see RonaldJ. Gilson, Drafting an Effective Greenmail Prohibition, 88 Colum.
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In such circumstances, whether cumulative voting would increase the
value of the firm is not obvious. Minority representation on the board

could add independent, critical scrutiny of management action and
thereby improve corporation decision-making and managerial accounta-

bility. Or cumulative voting could lead to costly managerial strategies to
buy off a determined minority, in addition to potential disharmony on
the board. 147 In any event, management has been able to use its influ-

ence over the proxy process and the not altogether fanciful concerns regarding cumulative voting to eliminate cumulative voting from most
148
public corporation charters.
The analysis thus far suggests that cumulative voting, conceived as a
means of proportional representation for minority interests, may become
a vehicle for minority rent-seeking. But this concern depends on a particular ownership structure, in which a discrete minority faces a disorganized majority. The ownership structure of the typical public corporation
is now visibly different from this model. For many firms, institutions as a
L. Rev. 329 (1988), and management might therefore prefer the option of buying off an
obstreperous shareholder, see, e.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d. 194 (Del. 1991) (G.M.'s
repurchase of shares of Ross Perot), and private gain-seeking may take forms other than
greenmail.
147. This argument is not inconsistent with Bhagat and Brickley's finding of average
negative shareholder wealth effects associated with the elimination of cumulative voting.
See Bhagat & Brickley, supra note 57, at 353-55. The board access provided by cumulative
voting may increase shareholder wealth in two ways: first, it may improve the firm's
performance because of the activity of a "relational" investor; second, it may increase the
possibility of a takeover bid, both generally and relative to other firms in the industry. See
supra notes 127-129 and accompanying text. Bhaghat and Brickley's sample was drawn
from the period 1962-82, but almost all cases of the elimination of cumulative voting (17
of 19) occurred after the 1968 adoption of the Williams Act, see Bhagat & Brickley, supra
note 57, at 348-51. Thus the pure corporate governance effect and the takeover effect of
elimination are hard to disaggregate. A comparable study of firms that are currently
eliminating cumulative voting might possibly separate the effects, because poison pills and
state antitakeover laws and cases have significantly reduced the possibility of hostile
acquisitions.
148. It has also been argued that cumulative voting would reduce the value of the firm
because it potentially impedes changes in control and because it "increases the chance that
there will be multipeaked preferences among the members of the board" that create the
potential for "inconsistent or illogical decisions." Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & Econ. 395, 409-10 (1983). Because of the
interaction of cumulative voting and board classification, cumulative voting indeed has
defensive uses, see infra text accompanying notes 181-182, but managements promoting
the elimination of cumulative voting have obviously decided that on balance it facilitates
changes in control, see supra text accompanying notes 92-93. Moreover, the firms that
contemplate a defensive use have adopted contingent cumulative voting schemes that
restrict its availability to circumstances in which a single shareholder owns more than a
threshold amount, see supra note 122 and accompanying text. Inconsistent decisionmaking or "cycling" on a board may be more likely with cumulative voting. Nonetheless, it
seems unlikely to be a significant problem because of the small group dynamics of a board
engaged in repeat play, faced with both the immediate evidence of a cycle and its
destructive consequence. See Gordon, supra note 6, at 371-72.
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group own 50 percent or more of the stock. 149 Cumulative voting in such
a firm should play a very different role: it should give activist institutions
the power to put directors on the board. In exercising that power, institutions would almost assuredly act on behalf of shareholder welfare generally, and not as part of a rent-seeking strategy. The elements that limit
the power of individual institutions-the ownership constraints and the
limits on managerial compensation-also make it very unlikely that institutions would use this governance mechanism to seek significant private
gains. In order to accumulate the votes necessary to elect directors, activist institutions would have to coordinate their actions, which would give
rise to cross-monitoring of institutional behavior. 150 Institutional managers would have little incentive to pursue private gains because they cannot
capture such gains in their compensation. The strategy that institutions
would reliably pursue under cumulative voting would be to enhance the
quality, independence, and accountability of the board in the hope that

this will improve the firm's performance. Institutions will earn returns
from this strategy through their share ownership, meaning that the benefits of institutional engagement flow to all shareholders. 15 1 This model
reconceives the purpose of cumulative voting: Instead of providing a

mechanism for minority representation, cumulative voting becomes a vehicle for virtual representation of majoritarian interests by a well-moti15 2
vated minority.
149. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
150. See Black, supra note 6, at 855-61 (An institution will use its voting power
appropriately because the reputation that ensues "will elicit cooperation from other money
managers."); Mark.J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan,
and the United States, 102 Yale LJ. 1927, 1981-82 (1993) (noting that coalitions among
institutions usually are a prerequisite to action). This mutual monitoring can also be
relied upon to limit the possible rent-seeking of other potential large investors, such as
suppliers or customers, who in Japanese keiretsu fashion may acquire stock and attempt to
exert influence.
Indeed, the board composition approach to relational investing, of which cumulative
voting is a part, will reduce the opportunistic potential of large investors, including
institutions. Investor influence will tend to be mediated through the board, whose
proceedings are more susceptible to legal scrutiny than behind-the-scenes maneuvering.
Rent-seeking possibilities by institutional investors already exist; a board composition
approach will make cross-monitoring easier. See Gordon, supra note 6, at 376-379.
151. Underlying this argument is a claim that all shareholders, irrespective of risk and
time preferences, prefer that corporations maximize the share price, a claim of
"shareholder unanimity." Although shareholder unanimity theorems are unlikely to hold
in the pure forms as presented in the finance literature, see Gordon, supra note 6, at
368-70, in practice public shareholders are likely to be better off on average if managers
can be disciplined to pursue share price maximization. The important point is that
institutional investors are likely to pursue gains common to all shareholders rather than
private gains allegedly pursued by the large shareholding individual.
152. Burke defines virtual representation as a relationship in which "there is a
communion of interests and a sympathy in feelings and desires between those who act in
the name of any description of people and the people in whose name they act." Edmund
Burke, Burke's Politics 494 (RossJ.S. Hoffman & Paul Levack eds., 1949). For a general
discussion, see Hanna F. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation 173-89 (1967). For a
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Viewed in this light, cumulative voting helps overcome the rational
apathy problem in the public firm. It changes in a favorable way the costbenefit analysis of the activist institutional shareholder. Compare two
strategies for adding a minority of independent directors to the board: a
direct election contest and cumulative voting.' 5 3 Success in the direct
election requires 51 percent of the vote; success under cumulative voting
requires only minority support (how much support depends on the
number of directors up for election).154 Although the exact cost funcdiscussion of virtual representation in American constitutional law, see John H. Ely,
Democracy and Distrust 82-88 (1980).
One possible objection to this model is that opening the door to the use of cumulative
voting for institutions, who might represent all public shareholders, will necessarily open
the door as well to its use by minorities with private gain-seeking objectives. The answer is
that the ownership structure that makes this reconception of cumulative voting possible
will also reduce the risk of its use in rent-seeking, because of greater checking of the
minority and greater monitoring of management. A minority gains its power because of
the disorganization of the opposing majority. Institutions will provide an organized
counterweight in firms that adopt cumulative voting on the theory proposed here.
Classification, which raises the threshold of interest necessary to elect directors, may also
play a role in reducing this risk. See infra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
The heightened concern about greenmail in the 1980s in firms that had cumulative
voting, see supra note 146, is not an objection to this argument. To be sure, those firms
may have had significant institutional share ownership. What they lacked was shareholder
organization (although later in the decade firms came under increased institutional
pressure to resist greenmail). The initial formation of an activist shareholder block, the
shareholder mobilization necessary to push management to adopt cumulative voting, and
the annual negotiation over board composition by the activist minority would all generate
an organizational counterweight to potential opportunistic use of cumulative voting by a
minority stockholder.
153. As discussed below, the proxy rules now permit a dissident to present a slate of
directors that includes some of management's nominees as well as its own candidates. See
infra note 172 and accompanying text. The assumption on which the discussion proceeds
is that the activist institution is engaging in a representation contest rather than a control
contest. The number of directors that an institution might want to add to a board is a
complicated question. Presumably the institution wants to break up the small group
psychology that might inhibit the board's monitoring of managers, and seeks to enhance
the sense of accountability that directors will feel to shareholders. Less desirable would be
a sentinel, who could alert large shareholders to corporate events as appropriate. The
decision would depend very much on the particular firm and the particular director(s) the
institution might want to add.
For further debate on the prospects of institutional investors misusing power in the
corporate governance context, compare Edward B. Rock, Controlling the Dark Side of
Relational Investing, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. - (forthcoming 1994) (instances of abuse) with
John C. CoffeeJr., The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Halftime Report, 15 Cardozo
L. Rev. - (forthcoming 1994) (serious problems unlikely).
154. The measures of success may not be identical. Assume an institution wishes to
add 5 directors to a 15-person board. Under straight voting, if it can gather 51 percent
support, it can elect those 5 directors at once, even if the board has three classes. Under
cumulative voting, obtaining minority support will produce fewer than 5 directors
(depending on the percentage obtained) and, ironically, if the institution can gather
majority support, may not always produce as good an outcome as under straight voting. In
the hypothetical above, for example, management, with 49 percent, would win 2 seats. Of
course, under straight voting, if the institution fails to obtain 51 percent, it loses
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tions depend on the distribution of share ownership in the particular
firm, on average the organizational and campaign costs for success under
cumulative voting will surely be less than in the direct election. 55 The
majority of shareholders in a public corporation may in fact remain apathetic, because not every institution will play an activist role and because
of coordination costs among institutions (assuming that individual institutions continue to own relatively small blocks only). But a core of institutional activists, a well-organized minority, could use cumulative voting
to play a significant role in a board-composition strategy, whose benefits
all shareholders would ratably receive. The goal would not be to nominate a specific minority slate, but rather to use the structural leverage of a
cumulative provision to obtain agreement on directors who would add
independence and perhaps particular entrepreneurial strengths to the
board. In this way, cumulative voting would become a remedy to a genuine current problem: how to enhance the power of shareholders in order
to buttress the independence of the board and its capacity to monitor the
managerial team.1 56
The revival of cumulative voting in an era of growing institutional
stock ownership can also be defended in terms of comparative market
liquidity. Cumulative voting arose at a time when stock markets for most
firms were illiquid. Because exit was difficult, voice required special protection.' 5 7 As markets became deeper and broader, the need to protect
voice in public firms via cumulative voting diminished; an investor dissatisfied with management's running of the firm could sell-this became the
"Wall Street Rule." Modem revisions of mandatory cumulative voting
statutes reflect the importance of market liquidity in their continuation
of mandatory cumulative voting in the closely-held firm. 158 As noted
completely. So cumulative voting will be an influence-maximizing strategy when
institutions believe they can regularly assemble a significant minority voting block in
director elections but not a majority.

155. For a useful summary of the economics of collective action, see Rock, supra note
16, at 453-63 (1991).

156. Thus it should be clear that this paper does not argue for a return to mandatory
cumulative voting, but argues rather that for firms with a particular ownership structure,

cumulative voting can function in a way that should increase the value of the firm to
shareholders. There might well be circumstances, for example, a firm with an ESOP with

passthrough voting, see, e.g., supra text accompanying note 126 (discussing election
campaign at Pacific Enterprises by union representative), when cumulative voting,
whatever its potential virtues as a vehicle of minority representation, would not serve this
goal.

157. See supra text accompanying notes 5-6.
158. This is reflected in otherwise permissive statutes that make exceptions for close
corporations, see Cal. Corp. Code §§ 301.5, 708 (West 1990 & Supp. 1993); Haw. Rev. Stat.
§ 415-33 (1988), as well as statutes that apply to corporations where the existing ownership
structure would lead to minority representation on the board (typically close
corporations), see Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.215 (West 1985); Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-531
(1993); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.55 (Baldwin 1992); S.C. Code Ann. § 33-7-280 (Law.
Co-op. 1992).
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above, 159 many institutional investors now feel that exit is much less feasible-that their effective market liquidity is substantially diminished.
Thus voice once again becomes more important and, in appropriate circumstances, deserving of the special protection that cumulative voting
can offer.
Cumulative voting may be particularly desirable for firms facing a
complicated competitive environment, in which the adaptability of the
firm becomes increasingly valuable. A standard objection to cumulative
voting is its potential for boardroom disruption that distracts management from its tasks.16 This objection stands, although in weaker form,
even with an ownership structure that reduces the risks of private gainseeking and this makes opportunistic disruption unlikely. The objection
is founded on the same assumptions about boardroom dynamics that
lead managers to prefer a collegial board rather than a monitoring
board. 1' 1 But as the firm's ability to adapt quickly to new competitive
scenarios gains in value, the risks of boardroom complacency become
much more threatening than the risks of boardroom disruption. The balance then shifts in favor of the desirability of more tension in the boardroom and more questioning of management's plans and underlying
assumptions, all of which may hasten the firm's response to changed circumstance. Thus the institutional use of cumulative voting, which buttresses director independence and accountability, will strengthen the
board's ability to prod management in valuable ways. Not only may cumulative voting help address the governance problems faced by locked-in
institutional holders, but it may also enhance the board's role in the
firm's early warning system against economic obsolescence.
Such a renewal of cumulative voting at firms with an appropriate
ownership structure will serve managerial interests as well. Cumulative
voting increases the likelihood that institutions will take a "board composition" approach to their role as relational shareholder rather than resort
to a "policy participation" approach. In conjunction with other reforms
62
that would enhance their influence over the composition of the board,
activist institutions may decide that their long-run interests are better
served by working through the board than through special access to management. Managers may find board-centered institutional engagement
less threatening or disruptive than the alternatives.
B. Implementation
What are the practical problems to implementation of this scheme?
The most significant one is that, in the absence of a mandatory statute,
159. See supra text accompanying note 5.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 139-140.
161. See Melvin A.Eisenberg, The Structure of the Corporation 158, 162-70 (1976).
162. Among the proposals that have been made recently are: the right to nominate
directors via the management proxy, confidential voting, and requiring the nominating
committee to consist of independent directors.
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the charter must provide for cumulative voting, at least under Delaware
law. In almost all states, managers have veto power over charter amendment, which requires an affirmative board resolution as well as a shareholder vote. This means that cumulative voting can be added only after a
campaign in which shareholders, through affirmative endorsement of
precatory resolutions and other efforts, persuade managers to make this
change. How hard will it be to get majority shareholder support for this
change? How hard will it be subsequently to persuade managers to adopt
the necessary resolution?
1. Persuadingshareholders.- One useful piece of evidence is the indication of a base level of support for current shareholder proposals in
favor of cumulative voting. As Table II indicates, recent proposals have
drawn, on average, approximately twenty percent of the shareholder
votes cast on the proposal. This support is growing, albeit slowly; in no
recent case has a cumulative voting proposal obtained majority support.
It is significant that support for cumulative voting proposals varies widely
among firms. This suggests that shareholders are sensitive to firm-specific
factors in weighing the value of cumulative voting.
TABLE II

No. of
proposals

Avg.
in favor

High %

Low %

1990163

50

17.7

39.0

3.1

1991164

46

19.0

37.0

1992165
1993166

34
28

20.2
22.6

32.3
44.9

6.4
10.8
6.0

Year

163. Corporate Governance Background ReportJ: Cumulative Voting, IRRC Corp.

Governance Service (IRRC) J-2 (1991) [hereinafter IRRC Background Report J1. A
proposal at Bank of Boston received 39.0% support; a proposal at Carter-Wallace received
3.1% support. See id. The IRRC generally reports support as a percentage of shareholders
voting for or against a matter, not including abstentions in the denominator. Companies
often claim that shareholder proposals that receive a majority of votes cast for or against
have not passed because they either count abstentions or insist on a majority of shares
outstanding, which includes shares not present at the meeting.

164. 1992 Background Report Update: Cumulative Voting, IRRC Corp. Governance
Service (IRRC) JJ-2 toJJ-3 (Mar. 3, 1992) [hereinafter IRRC 1992 Update]. A proposal at
Zenith Electronics received 37% support; a proposal at Fuqua Ind. received 6.4% support.
See id.
165. Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Voting Results on Corporate Governance
Proposals, Corp. Governance Bull., May-June 1993, at 7, 8, 11 [hereinafter IRRC May 1993

Voting Results]; Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Corp. Governance Bull., July-Aug.
1992, at 27. A proposal at Zenith Electronics received 32.3% support; a proposal at
DuPont received 10.8% support.
166. IRRC May 1993 Voting Results, supra note 165, at 8, 11. A proposal at Pacific
Enterprises received 44.9% support; a proposal at Church and Dwight received 6.0%

support. See id. at 11.
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Current cumulative voting shareholder proposals have been the least
popular governance proposal in the recent wave of shareholder activism,
perhaps because of their idiosyncratic sponsorship and weak theoretical
foundation. 167 Among institutional investors, the response follows a familiar pattern: a majority of public pension funds tend to support cumulative voting, private pension funds almost always oppose it, and
investment managers and charitable endowments generally oppose it.168
On the other hand, management proposals to eliminate cumulative voting have generated significant, and increasing, investor concern. The
overall level of shareholder support for such proposals has fallen from
approximately 70 percent in 1986 to 64 percent in 1991.169 Thus, on
average, roughly twice as many shareholders against the elimination of
cumulative voting as vote for its reinstatement. 170 Perhaps more important has been the fact that management proposals to eliminate cumulative voting have produced some very close votes in recent years, in some
17 1
cases attaining only a bare majority.
All this suggests not only some shift in shareholder attitudes toward
cumulative voting, but more importantly, growing attention to the nuances of actual corporate governance arrangements and implications.
The variation in the level of shareholder support indicates that differences among firms in both ownership distribution and the consequences
of potential minority access to the board are important factors. Thus the
current failure of cumulative voting proposals should not dishearten activist institutions who are seeking a means of increasing their influence
over the board: General shareholder proposals for the reinstatement of
cumulative voting based on the simple assertion of the unalloyed virtues
of "minority representation" may not be persuasive in light of the possibilities for minority shareholder opportunism. But shareholders who
167. See IRRC Background Report B, supra note 126, at B-7.
168. See Investor Responsibility Research Ctr., Cumulative Voting Update, Mar. 3,
1992, at.J-4. A 1991 survey, for example, reported 58% of public pension funds as favoring
cumulative voting proposals, compared to only 14% of private pension funds, 32% of
investment managers, and 37% of charitable endowments. See id. The general advice
provided by Institutional Shareholder Services is to favor cumulative voting. See
Institutional Shareholder Service, supra note 122, at 173.
169. See IRRC Background ReportJ, supra note 163, atJ-3; IRRC 1992 Update, supra
note 164, atJJ-3 (providing percentage for each of six cases).
170. This is based on shares actually voted, not abstentions or no-shows, which, if not
constant over time or across reinstatement as opposed to elimination proposals, would
confound the direct comparison in the text.
171. In 1991 close votes over proposals took place at Interstate Power (58.3% in
favor); Mips Computer System (55.6% in favor); Standard Federal Bank (50.2% in favor).
See IRRC 1992 Update, supra note 164, atJJ-3. Similar close votes took place in 1990 at
Tidewater (51.2% in favor) and West (56.2% in favor). See IRRC Background ReportJ,
supra note 163, atJ-3. And in 1989 close votes took place at Intel (54.8% in favor, part of
general proposal for reincorporation in Delaware from California) and Tandon (51.7% in
favor, part of general proposal for reincorporation in Delaware from California). See
IRRC Background Report B, supra note 126, at B-8.
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may be reluctant to vote for an abstract governance theory may well vote
for a governance device when they understand the implications given a
certain distribution of ownership and power in the firm. In particular,
institutional investors should be willing to reexamine their positions as
they understand that the effect of reinstating cumulative voting at an appropriate firm will be to provide a low cost way to enhance institutional
voice in the selection of directors. It should be possible to assemble a
majority coalition on behalf of cumulative voting at many firms with significant institutional ownership.
One potential objection to this proposal is that the conditions under
which it becomes possible to add cumulative voting to the governance
structure of a particular firm make such a change unnecessary. That is, if
the majority of shareholders could be organized on behalf of this cumulative voting proposal, then they also would support a proxy contest on
behalf of minority directors. Under the recently adopted proxy reforms,
a proxy contestant can now present a slate that includes management
nominees as well as the contestant's nominees. 17 2 Since the goal of the
two strategies is the same, and since the cumulative voting strategy requires both shareholder action and subsequent management agreement,
why not follow the direct election strategy?
The key difference is that cumulative voting, once in place, would
permit an activist core of institutions to play a significant role in the annual decision over board composition, whereas the direct election strategy requires the assembling of a majority coalition annually. This makes
the cumulative voting strategy stronger in at least two respects. First, institutions are quite diverse, facing different incentives and cultural constraints on their potential corporate governance engagement. Many
institutions may prefer to be passive with regard to the annual decision
regarding director elections but understand that they will benefit from
the activism of other institutions. Thus, passive institutions who would
not like involvement in annual proxy contests could be mobilized on behalf of a structural change that would empower active institutions.
Second, it is much more difficult to organize an absolute majority on
a yearly basis than to organize the minority necessary to elect a director
under cumulative voting. Take for example a relatively small, classified
board for a public corporation: a twelve-member board with four members elected annually. The standard cumulative voting formulas show
that a twenty-one percent block could elect one director at each annual
election, ultimately providing for a potential institutional representation
of three. 173 In the absence of cumulative voting, gradual attainment of
this level of representation would require three successive proxy contests
172. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-4(d) (1993). This change was adopted pursuant to the
suggestion in Ronald J. Gilson et al., How the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive
Engagement: Regulatory Barriers to Electing a Minority of Directors, 17 J. Corp. L. 29,

45-47 (1991).
173. See supra note 8.
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in which success required majority shareholder support. 17 4 Holding together a twenty-one percent block would require a modest degree of coordination among activist institutions at a given firm and a relatively
inexpensive proxy campaign. 175 Holding together a fifty-one percent
block would likely require significantly greater organizational efforts and
possibly a quite extensive (and expensive) solicitation of shareholder
votes. 176 Even at firms with a stable core of institutional investors, some
institutions may prefer to continue their pattern of stock picking and
moving with the market and would have to be organized on an annual
basis. The point, of course, is not that institutions would routinely mount
proxy contests, but rather that in the negotiations over the composition
of the board, the hand of activist institutions would be much stronger
with cumulative voting in the background than with only the direct elec17
tion option.

7

174. This assumes that the institutions wish to add one director annually rather than
three all at once, which in the case of a four-person class would mean defeating all but one
of management's nominees. Such a challenge would seem highly confrontational and
would evoke a vigorous management response that could make it very difficult for
institutions to gather majority shareholder support. Moreover, annual as opposed to
episodic institutional engagement over director nominations is part of the accountability
process at the heart of relational investing.
175. An institution's solicitation of 10 or fewer shareholders on behalf of director
nominees is not subject to proxy regulation (other than the antifraud requirements). See
17 C.FR. § 240.14a-2(b) (2) (1993). Depending on the institutional ownership pattern,
this could lead to very low-cost director election under cumulative voting. Where further
solicitation was necessary, an institution soliciting fellow shareholders on behalf of director
nominees would be required to file a proxy statement with the SEC, even after the SEC's
1992 proxy rule reforms, see Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18J. Corp. L.
1, 49-50 & n.73 (1992), but if the universe of its solicitation under cumulative voting was
limited to a small number of institutional investors, it could reduce mailing costs
substantially and avoid an expensive public campaign. Additionally, the effort to organize
a 21% block (rather than a 51% block) would face a lower risk of triggering a poison pill,
the trigger point of which is typically set at 15 or 20 percent.
176. Alternatively, the number of firms for which the ownership structure would
permit a low cost direct election strategy to elect minority directors is fewer than the firms
for which a low cost cumulative voting strategy is possible.
177. As observed previously, see supra note 154, this is true given an ownership
structure in which activist institutions can assemble significant minority, but not majority,
voting support.
The cumulative voting strategy also seems superior to other recent proposals to
increase institutional influence over board composition, in particular, proposals to give
institutions the right to nominate a specific number of directors on the managerial slate
for firms with a certain level of institutional stock ownership, see, e.g., Louis Lowenstein,
What's Wrong With Wall Street: Short Term Gain and the Absentee Shareholder 209-11
(1988); Felix Rohatyn, Power and Property: Financial Institutions and Corporate America,
Columbia Univ. Institutional Investor Project, Conference on Relational Investing, May 6,
1993, reprinted at 1 Corp. Governance Advisor 30 (Aug./Sept. 1993), or more radical
suggestions such as turning over control of the corporation's proxy machinery to its largest
stockholders, see George W. Dent, Jr., Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the
Public Corporation, 1989 Wis. L. Rev. 881, 907-08. Such proposals will require either
legal change or widespread acceptance by public corporations and a mechanism for
institutional agreement on specific nominees. Once institutions are given the "right" to
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2. Persuadingmanagers. - The most significant impediment to the
implementation of cumulative voting is the need for management, or,
more precisely, the incumbent board, to be willing to adopt the resolution that is necessary to put a proposed cumulative voting charter amendment before shareholders. Precatory resolutions are, after all, only
precatory; management is legally free to ignore them. t 78 Why should
managers agree to a proposal the very point of which is to increase the
level of institutional monitoring? One reason is that a majority vote by
the shareholders is hard to ignore, particularly where the proponents are
institutional investors. Board refusal of such a request would seem provocative and might precipitate an election contest in the following year to
produce a more responsive board. Once one firm succumbs to the pressure, other firms will find it very hard to resist. Another reason for managers to agree is that the alternatives may be worse. Managers may prefer
to encourage institutions to pursue a "board composition" strategy rather
than a more confrontational approach in which activist institutions, finding themselves thwarted in their efforts for board influence, press for
"policy participation."
Any assessment of the potential level of managerial resistance to the
adoption of cumulative voting must consider the radical changes that
have occurred in the corporate control market. The pressure on states to
eliminate mandatory cumulative voting and the movement by individual
firms similarly to amend their charters arose from the increased vulnerability to hostile takeovers associated with cumulative voting, not because
of "good governance" considerations. However, poison pills and the discretion given management by state antitakeover legislation and judicial
179
decisions have greatly reduced the threat of a hostile takeover bid.
The risks to management from cumulative voting have thus been substantially decreased.
Furthermore, board classification, now found in approximately one
half of the 1500 firms in the IRRC database, 8 0 should offer managers an
additional degree of comfort. Historically, classification has been criticized as undercutting the influence of cumulative voting.' 81 It was widely
adopted in the 1970s and 1980s as part of the standard antitakeover package. In the present context, however, classification may make cumulative
voting more appealing, precisely because it raises the share ownership
necessary to obtain board representation. This means that a coalition of
pick directors, the process of agreement may become complicated. The cumulative voting
strategy employs a familiar, well-understood technique, rather than an innovation, can be
implemented through self-help rather than legal change, and provides a simple
mechanism for director selection that will shape the institutional coordination process.
178. See, e.g., Auer v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 590, 593 (N.Y. 1954) (shareholder
proposal for reinstatement of officer); 4 Louis Loss &Joel Seligman, Securities Regulation
2006 (3d ed. 1990) (in connection with SEC shareholder proposal rule).
179. See Gordon, supra note 3.
180. See Corp. Takeover Defenses, supra note 92.
181. See supra text accompanying note 148.
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institutions could assemble a sufficient block, but that the individual
shareholder seeking representation of his or her minority interests,
whose motives and actions might conceivably be questionable, probably
82
would not.'
The institutional proponents of cumulative voting might tailor the
proposal in a way to further limit grounds for objection. The proposal
might be presented as a time-limited experiment, rather than as a permanent change in governance structure. For example, the proposed charter
amendment could expire unless renewed by a shareholder vote (that
management would be required to schedule) in, say, the sixth year following adoption of the amendment. Or perhaps the proposal could be
structured to provide for a version of contingent cumulative voting, such
that cumulative voting would be non-applicable if a single shareholder or
partnership obtained beneficial ownership of more than X percent of the
stock.' 83 In the alternative, cumulative voting might be made contingent
on beneficial ownership of more than Y percent of the firm's stock by
entities required to file on Form 13F or other comparable forms required
of institutional investors only. 184 Both of these modifications might further clarify to management that the goal of the cumulative voting provision is to enhance institutional influence, rather than to serve as a vehicle
for a control entrepreneur.
CONCLUSION

Institutional investors who decide that a board-composition strategy
is the best and most durable mode of relational investing must think
about how to increase their influence over the selection of directors. The
independence of the board and its ability to monitor management very
much depends on developing in the directors an immediate sense of accountability to shareholders. To be sure, institutions can negotiate with
management over board nominations in any event, or make recommendations to the board's nominating committee. But the institutions' negotiating position-and the ultimate sense of director independence-will
obviously be enhanced by a built-in structure that provides a ready avenue for board representation as a back-up. Therefore it will be worth the
time, effort, and expenditure of resources for institutions to organize majority support in favor of resolutions that urge management to institute
cumulative voting and to begin to campaign with management for the
appropriate charter amendments.
182. This is not an endorsement of classification, and certainly is not meant to suggest
that firms pursuing cumulative voting on the proposal here should classify the board, since
the risks of minority board representation in a firm with substantial institutional ownership
are easy to overstate. Rather the point is that governance arrangements currently found in
many large firms should increase managers' comfort.
183. This would reduce the utility of cumulative voting in a control contest waged by a
single large holder.
184. This would limit the availability of cumulative voting to times in the history of a
firm when its ownership structure fits the model I have described.

1994]

RELATIONAL INVESTING AND CUMULATIVE VOTING

181

APPENDiX I

Alabama: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1959, requiring opt-in
through articles, Alabama Business Corporation Act, No. 414, § 53, 1959
Ala. Acts, 1055, 1077 (codified at Ala. Code § 10-2A-53 (1987)).
Alaska: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1913, Act of Apr. 28,
1913, ch. 58, § 10, 1913 Alaska Sess. Laws 121-22; converted to permissive
cumulative voting in 1964, requiring opt-out through bylaws, Act of mar.
9, 1964, ch. 11, § 1, 1964 Alaska Sess. Laws 15, 15; required opt-out
through articles in 1988, Act of June 17, 1988, ch. 166, § 1, 1988 Alaska
Sess. Laws 1, 49 (but grandfathering of firms previously opting out in
bylaws, Act ofJune 1, 1989, ch. 82, § 58, 1989 Alaska Sess. Laws 1, 29-30)
(codified at Alaska Stat. § 10.06.420 (1989)).
Arizona: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1910, Ariz. Const. art.
XIV, § 10, reflected in statutory provision, Act of May 16, 1912, ch. 49,
§ 23, 1912 Ariz. Sess. Laws 216, 224; Act of'June 20, 1912, ch. 59, § 3, 1912
Ariz. Sess. Laws 159, 161, currently codified without substantial change at
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-33 (1990).
Arkansas: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1927, Act of Mar. 15,
1927, No. 141, § 1, 1927 Ark. Acts 489, 489-90; converted to permissive
cumulative voting in 1987, requiring opt-in through articles, Arkansas
Business Corporation Act, No. 958, § 64-716(B), 1987 Ark. Acts 2345,
2408-09 (codified at Ark. Code Ann. § 4-27-728 (Michie 1991)).
California: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1878, Act of Feb. 1,
1878, ch. 45, § 1, 1878 Civil Code Am. 78, 78; converted to permissive
cumulative voting for public corporations in 1989, requiring opt-out
through amendment of articles or bylaws, Act of Sept. 26, 1989, ch. 876,
§§ 2, 4, 1989 Cal. Stat. 2872, 2873, 2875 (codified at Cal. Corp. Code
§§ 301.5, 708 (West 1990)).
Colorado: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1895, Act of Apr. 8,
1895, ch. 66, § 1, 1895 Colo. Sess. Laws 150, 151; converted to permissive
cumulative voting in 1915, requiring opt-in through articles or bylaws, Act
of Apr. 12, 1915, ch. 59, § 1, 1915 Colo. Sess. Laws 173, 174; required optin through articles only, Act of May 12, 1931, ch. 70, § 8, 1931 Colo. Sess.
Laws 221, 234; made cumulative voting applicable to newly-organized
firms that did not opt-out in articles, Colorado Corporation Act, ch. 32,
§§ 32, 50(g), 1958 Colo. Sess. Laws 119, 139, 150 (codified at Colo. Rev.
Stat. Ann. §§ 7-2-102(g), § 7-4-116(4) (b) (West 1990)).
Connecticut- adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1959, requiring
opt-in through articles, Stock Corporation Act, No. 618, §§ 43, 44, 1959
Conn. Pub. Acts 1180, 1207-08 (codified at Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 33325 (West 1987)).
Delaware: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1917, requiring optin through articles, Act of Mar. 20, 1917, ch. 113, § 9, 29 Del. Laws 320,
326 (1917) (codified at Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 214 (1991)).
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District of Columbia: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1954, requiring opt-in through articles, District of Columbia Business Corporation Act, ch. 269, § 27, 68 Stat. 177, 191 (1954) (codified at D.C. Code
Ann. § 29-327(d) (1991)).
Florida: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1925, requiring opt-in
through articles, Act ofJune 1, 1925, ch. 10096, § 28, 1925 Fla. Laws 119,
131 (codified at Fla. Stat. Ann. § 607.0728 (West 1993)).
Georgia: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1968, requiring opt-in
through articles, Georgia Business Corporation Code, No. 982, § 1, 1968
Ga. Laws 565, 618-19 (codified at Ga. Code Ann. § 14-2-728 (1989)).
Hawaii: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1945, Act of May 19,
1945, Act 228, § 1, 1945 Haw. Sess. Laws 239, 240-41; converted to permissive cumulative voting for public corporations in 1985, requiring optout through articles or bylaws, Act of Apr. 9, 1985, Act 4, § 3, 1985 Haw.
Sess. Laws 3, 5 (codified at Haw. Rev. Stat. § 415-33 (1988)).
Idaho: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1890, Idaho Const. art.
XI, § 4, reflected in statutory provision, Act of Mar. 16, 1907, No. 73, § 2,
1907 Idaho Sess. Laws 540, 540-51; repealed constitutional provision but
added guarantee of permissive cumulative voting in S.J. Res. of Mar. 12,
1982, No. 110, § 4, 1982 Ohio Sess. Laws 930, ratified Nov. 2, 1982; converted to permissive cumulative voting in 1983, requiring opt-out
through articles and requiring supermajority approval (75%) to adopt
amendment limiting cumulative voting, Act of Apr. 12, 193, ch. 201, § 1,
1983 Idaho Sess. Laws 545, 547 (codified at Idaho Code § 30-1-33
(1993)).
Illinois: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1870, Ill. Const. of
1870, art. XI, § 3, reflected in statutory provision, Act of'July 1, 1872, § 3,
1872 Ill. Laws 296, 297; repealed constitutional provision in 1970, but
protected existing cumulative voting rights, Ill. Const. of 1970, Transition
Sched., § 8 (1970); converted to permissive cumulative voting in 1981,
requiring opt-in through articles for new corporations and requiring optout through articles by unanimous shareholder consent for pre-1982 corporations, Act of Sept. 25, 1981, Pub. Act 82-650, § 1, 1981 Ill. Laws 3377,
3379; permitted opt-out through articles by ordinary amendment process
(simple majority vote required) for pre-1982 corporations, Business Corporation Act of 1983, Pub. Act 83-1025, 1983 Ill. Laws 6943, 6988 (codified at Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 805, para. 5/7.40 (Smith-Hurd 1993)).
Indiana: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1929, requiring opt-in
through articles, The Indiana General Corporation Act, ch. 215, § 8, 1929
Ind.Acts 725, 736 (codified at Ind. Code Ann. § 23-1-30-9 (Burns 1989)).
Iowa: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1959, requiring opt-in
through articles, Iowa Business Corporation Act, ch. 321, § 32, 1959 Iowa
Acts 344, 357 (codified at Iowa Code Ann. § 490-728 (West 1991)).
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Kansas: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1876, Act of Mar. 3,
1876, ch. 61, § 1, 1876 Kan. Sess. Laws 157, 157; converted to permissive
cumulative voting in 1988, requiring new corporations to opt-in through
articles and existing corporation to opt-out through articles amendment,
Act of Apr. 18, 1988, ch. 99, § 1, 1988 Kan. Sess. Laws 560, 561, Act of May
5, 1988, ch. 100, § 1, 1988 Kan. Sess. Laws 643, 643 (codified at Kan. Stat.
Ann. § 17-6504 (1988)).
Kentucky: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1891, Ky. Const.
§ 207 (1891), reflected in 1893 in statutory provision, Act of Mar. 5, 1893,
ch. 171, § 15, 1893 Ky. Acts 612, 618 (codified at Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 271B.7-280 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989)).
Louisiana: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1915, requiring optin through articles and requiring unanimous shareholder vote for subsequent elimination, Act of July 9, 1914, No. 267, § 11, 1914 La. Acts 521,
522; repealed such requirement for unanimous vote, Act ofJuly 18, 1928,
No. 250, § 32, 1928 La. Acts 409, 430-31 (codified at La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12:75 (West 1969)).
Maine: arguably adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1931 through
statutory provision that permitted corporations to "determine by their bylaws ... the number of votes to be given by shareholders," Act of Apr. 1,
1931, ch. 155, § 22, 1931 Me. Laws 124, 124, thus requiring opt-in
through bylaws; explicitly adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1971,
requiring opt-in through articles, Maine Business Corporation Act, ch.
439, § 622, 1971 Me. Laws 756, 810-11 (codified at Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
13-A, § 622 (West 1981)).
Maryland: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1888, requiring optin through articles or bylaws, Act of Apr. 5, 1888, ch. 510, § 1, 1888 Md.
Laws 804, 804; required opt-in through articles only, Act of Mar. 21, 1951,
ch. 135, § 1, 1951 Md. Laws 268, 269 (codified at Md. Code Ann., Corps.
& Ass'ns § 2-104 (1993)).
Massachusetts: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1955, requiring
opt-in through articles, Act of Mar. 15, 1955, ch. 173, 1955 Mass. Acts 100;
repealed permissive cumulative voting in 1956, Act of May 18, 1956, ch.
375, 1956 Mass. Acts 247 (at Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 156, § 32 (Law. Co-op.
1979)).
Michigan: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1885, Act of May 14,
1885, No. 112, § 1, 1885 Mich. Pub. Acts 116; converted to permissive
cumulative voting in 1929, requiring opt-out through articles and providing that elimination of cumulative voting by articles amendment is defeated by opposition sufficient to elect one director cumulatively, Act of
May 22, 1929, No. 267, ch. 1, §§ 8-8a, 1929 Mich. Pub. Acts 645, 654-56;
requiring opt-in through articles, Michigan General Corporation Act, No.
327, § 32, 1931 Mich. Pub. Acts 568, 579; readopted mandatory cumulative voting, Act of Aug. 5, 1937, No. 350, § 1, 1937 Mich. Pub. Acts 868;
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reconverted to permissive cumulative voting in 1972, requiring opt-in
through articles, Business Corporation Act, No. 284, § 451, 1972 Mich.
Pub. Acts 790, 819 (codified at Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.1451 (West
1990)).
Minnesota: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1905, requiring optin through articles, 1905 Minn. Rev. Laws § 2862 (codified at Minn. Stat.
Ann. § 300.24 (West 1985)); modified permissive cumulative voting to require opt-out through articles for newly-formed corporations, Act of Apr.
18, 1933, ch. 300, § 25, cl. 3, § 61, 1933 Minn. Laws 393, 414, 435; barred
elimination of cumulative voting if shareholder opposition is sufficient to
elect one director cumulatively, Act ofJune 14, 1983, ch. 368, § 4, 1983
Minn. Laws 2520, 2522 (codified at Minn. Stat. Ann. § 302A.215 (West
1985)).
Mississippi: adopted cumulative voting in 1890, Miss. Const. art. VII,
§ 194 (repealed 1987), reflected in 1892 in statutory provision, 1892 Miss.
Laws ch. 77, § 6; repealed constitutional provision in 1987, S. Con. Res.
550, Reg. Sess., 1987 Miss. Laws 1016, ratified Nov. 1987; converted to
permissive cumulative voting in 1988, requiring opt-out in articles, Act of
Apr. 18, 1988, ch. 368, § 6, 1988 Miss. Laws 150, 153-54 (codified at Miss.
Code Ann. § 79-4-7.28 (1989)).
Missouri: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1875, Mo. Const. of
1875, art. XII, § 6; reflected in statutory provision, Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 712,
930 (1879); repealed constitutional provision in 1933, H.RJ. Res. 80, 84th
Gen. Ass., 2d 1988 Reg. Sess., 1988 Mo. Laws 1030, ratified Aug. 1988;
converted to permissive cumulative voting in 1989, requiring opt-out
through either articles or bylaws, Act ofJune 6, 1989, C.C.S.H.S.S.B. 141,
sec. A, § 351.245(3), 1989 Mo. Laws 870, 872 (codified at Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 351.245 (Vernon 1991)).
Montana: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1879, Act of Feb. 21,
1879, § 1, 1879 Mont. Laws 42; reflected in 1889 in constitutional provision, Mont. Const. of 1890 art. xv, § 4; omitted constitutional provision in
1972 constitution; converted to permissive cumulative voting in 1991, requiring opt-out through articles and providing that elimination of cumulative voting by articles amendment is defeated by opposition sufficient to
elect one director cumulatively, Act of Apr. 6, 1991, ch. 368, § 64, 1991
Mont. Laws 876, 909-10 (codified at Mont. Code Ann. § 35-1-531
(1993)).
Nebraska: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1875, Neb. Const. of
1875, art. XI, Miscellaneous Corporations, § 5 (after 1972 constitutional
amendment, Neb. Const. of 1875, art. XII, § 1); reflected in statutory provision, Act of April 17, 1915, ch. 174, § 1, 1915 Neb. Laws 358 (codified at
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2033 (1991)).
Nevada: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1881, Act of Feb. 11,
1881, ch. 25, § 1, 1881 Nev. Stat. 34, 34-36; converted to permissive cu-
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mulative voting in 1903, requiring opt-out through articles, Act of Mar.
16, 1903, ch. 88, § 20, 1903 Nev. Stat. 121, 128; modified permissive cumulative voting to require opt-in through articles for newly-formed corporations, Act of Mar. 21, 1925, ch. 177, § 30, 1925 Nev. Stat. 287, 300
(codified at Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 78.360 (Michie 1991)).
New Hampshire: adopted mandatory cumulative voting 1981, New
Hampshire Business Corporation Act, ch. 556, § 1, 1981 N.H. Laws 362,
377 (apparently by mistaken omission of opt-in language); converted to
permissive cumulative voting in 1982, requiring opt-in through articles,
Act of Mar. 2, 1982, ch. 9, § 3, 1982 N.H. Laws 24, 25 (codified at N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 293-A:7.28 (Supp. 1992)).
NewJersey: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1900, requiring optin through articles, Act of Mar. 23, 1900, ch. 172, § 1, 1900 N.J. Laws 418
(codified at N.J. Stat. Ann. § 14A:5-24 (West 1992)).
New Mexico: adopted permissive cumulative voting, requiring opt-in
through articles, Act of Mar. 15, 1905, ch. 79, § 40, 1905 N.M. Laws 142,
158 (codified at N.M. Stat. Ann. § 53-11-33 (Michie 1991)).
New York: arguably adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1878, requiring opt-in through articles or bylaws, Act of May 23, 1878, ch. 334,
§ 1(3), 1878 N.Y. Laws 4211 (corporation may establish "the basis of voting at all meeting of association or directors thereof, giving at least one
vote to each member having paid for one full share"); explicitly adopted
permissive cumulative voting, requiring opt-in through articles, Act of
May 18, 1892, ch. 687, § 20, 1 3, 1892 N.Y. Laws 1800, 1807-08 (codified
at N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 618 (McKinney 1986)) (preserving prior right of
preexisting corporations).
North Carolina: adopted mandatory cumulative voting for corporations
with at least one 25% stockholder and permissive cumulative voting for
all others in 1905, requiring opt-in through articles, Act of Mar. 4, 1907,
ch. 457, § 1, 1905 N.C. Sess. Laws 666, 666-67; adopted mandatory cumulative voting for new corporations in 1955, Business Corporation Act, ch.
1371, § 1, 1955 N.C. Sess. Laws 1432, 1484-85 (effective in 1957); converted to permissive cumulative voting for public corporations, requiring
opt-in through articles in 1986, (but preserved mandatory cumulative voting for non-public corporations), Act ofJune 26, 1986, ch. 801, § 45, 1986
N.C. Sess. Laws 30, 41; converted to permissive cumulative voting for all
new corporations in 1989 (effective 1990), but preserved mandatory cumulative voting for pre-1957 corporations with 25% stockholder and
1957-1990 non-public corporations, except that cumulative voting in pre1990 cases could be eliminated through articles amendment unless opposed by shareholder vote sufficient to elect on director cumulatively,
North Carolina Business Corporation Act, ch. 265, § 1, 1989 N.C. Sess.
Laws 566 (effective 1990) (codified at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 55-7-28 (1990)).
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North Dakota: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1889, N.D.

Const. of 1889, art. VII, § 135 (amended 1919), currently N.D. Const. Art
XII, § 6; reflected in statutory provision as early as 1957, North Dakota
Business Corporation Act, ch. 102, § 30, 1957 N.D. Laws 130, 130 (codified at N.D. Cent. Code § 10-19.1-39 (1985)).
Ohio: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1898, Act of Apr. 23,
1898, § 3245, 1898 Ohio Laws 230; converted to permissive cumulative
voting in 1986, requiring opt-out by articles amendment (even for newlyformed corporations) which is defeated by shareholder opposition sufficient to elect one director cumulatively, Act of July 24, 1986, § 1, 1986
Ohio Laws 547, 548-50 (codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.55
(Baldwin 1986)).

Oklahoma: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1947, requiring optin through articles, Business Corporation Act, tit. 18, § 68(c), 1947 Okla.
Sess. Laws 84, 110 (codified at Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 1059 (West
1986)).
Oregon: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1953, requiring opt-in
through articles, Business Corporation Act, ch. 549, § 31(4), 1953 Or.
Laws 954, 971 (codified at Or. Rev. Stat. § 60.251 (1988)).
Pennsylvania: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1874, Pa. Const.
of 1874, art. 16, § 4, which was held to be self-executing, see 104 Pa. 150
(1883); which was reflected in statutory provision in 1874, Act of Apr. 29,
1874, No. 32, § 10, 1874 Pa. Laws 73, 78-79; and which constitutional
provision was repealed in 1966, H.RJ. Res. 3, Gen. Ass., 1964 Reg. Sess.,
1964 Pa. Laws 30, 31-32; S.J. Res. 3, Gen. Ass., 1965 Reg. Sess., 1965 Pa.
Laws 1909, 1910, ratified Nov. 1966, see Forward to 15 Pa. Cons. Stat.
Ann. p. LXVIII (1992); converted to permissive cumulative voting in
1968, requiring opt-out through articles for pre-1968 corporations and
opt-in through articles for newly formed corporations, except that
mandatory cumulative voting remained in effect for pre-1968 close corporations, Business Corporation Law, No. 216, § 28, 1968 Pa. Laws 459, 498;
eliminated mandatory cumulative voting for pre-1968 close corporations,
General Association Act of 1988, No. 1988-177, § 103 (§ 1758), 1988 Pa.
Laws 1444, 1547 (codified at 15 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1758 (1993)).
Rhode Island: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1920, requiring
opt-in through articles, General Corporation Law, ch. 1925, § 23, 1920
RI. Pub. Laws 184, 196 (codified at R.I. Gen. Laws § 7-1.1-31 (1992)).
South Carolina: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1895, S.C.
Const. of 1895, art. IX, § 11, made effective by statutory provision in 1901,
Act of Feb. 8, 1901, No. 403, § 1, 1901 S.C. Acts 715; repealed constitutional provision in 1971, J. Res. No. 1270 (1970), 1971 So. Car. Acts 47,
47-48; converted to permissive cumulative voting in 1981, requiring optout through articles and providing that elimination of cumulative voting
through articles amendment is defeated by opposition sufficient to elect
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one director cumulatively, South Carolina Business Corporation Act, § 2
(§ 33-11-200), 1981 S.C. Acts 504, 560-61; in course of adoption of various Model Business Corporation Act provisions in 1988, deleted (apparently inadvertently) articles amendment provision, South Carolina
Business Corporation Act of 1988, No. 444, § 2 (§ 33-7-280), 1988 S.C.
Acts. 2942, 3310; reinstated articles amendment provision, Act of May 7,
1990, No. 446, § 12, 1990 S.C. Acts. 2049, 2055-56 (codified at S.C. Code
Ann. § 33-7-280 (Law. Co-op. 1990)).
South Dakota: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1889, S.D. Const.
of 1889, art. XVII, § 5; reflected in statutory provision as early as 1965,
South Dakota Business Corporation Act, ch. 22, §§ 31, 36, 1965 S.D. Laws
34, 48, 50 (codified at S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 47-4-17, 47-5-6 (1991)).
Tennessee: provided for permissive cumulative voting 1929, requiring
opt-in through articles, Act of Apr. 10, 1929, ch. 90, § 30, 1929 Tenn.
Pub. Acts 235, 258 (codified at Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-17-209 (1988)).
Texas: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1955, requiring opt-out
through articles, Texas Business Corporation Act, ch. 64, art. 2.29(D),
1955 Tex. Gen. Laws 239, 255-56; modified permissive cumulative voting
in 1957 to require opt-in through articles for post-1957 corporations but
retained opt-out requirement for pre-1957 corporations, Act of Apr. 10,
1957, ch. 54, § 4A, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 111, 113-14; modified permissive
cumulative voting in 1961 to require opt-out through articles and to require that elimination of cumulative voting through articles amendment
receive two-thirds shareholder approval, Act of June 17, 1961, ch. 393,
§ 1, 1961 Tex. Gen. Laws 893; repealed two-thirds shareholder approval
requirement in 1973, Act ofJune 15, 1973, ch. 545, §§ 16, 17, 1973 Tex.
Gen. Laws 1486, 1495 (codified at Tex. Bus. Corp. Act Ann., art. 2.29
(West 1993)).
Utah: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1961, requiring opt-in
through articles, Utah Business Corporation Act, ch. 28, § 31, 1961 Utah
Laws 93, 108 (codified at Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-728 (1993)).
Vermont. adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1951, requiring opt-in
through original articles and prohibiting adoption of cumulative voting
through articles amendment by already-organized corporations, Act of
May 18, 1951, No. 122, § 1, 1951 Vt. Laws 137, 137-38; modified permissive cumulative voting in 1971, retaining permission to opt-in through
original articles, but repealing prohibition on amendment, Act of Apr. 9,
1970, No. 286, sec. 2, § 1879(d), 1971 Vt.. Laws 493, 512-13, ratified, Act
of Apr. 14, 1971, No. 51, § 19, 1971 Vt. Laws 71, 77 (codified at Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 11, § 1879(d) (1984)).
Virginia: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1903, requiring opt-in
through articles, Act of May 21, 1903, ch. 270, ch. 5, § 19, 1903 Va. Acts
437, 470 (codified at Va. Code Ann., § 13.1-669 (Michie 1993)).
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Washington: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1933, Act of Mar.
21, 1933, ch. 185, § 28,
I1, 1933 Wash. Laws 770, 790; converted to
permissive cumulative voting in 1965, requiring opt-out through articles,
Washington Business Corporation Act, ch. 53, § 33, 1965 Wash. Laws
1053, 1081-82 (effective 1967) (codified at Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§ 23B.07.280 (West 1993)).
West Virginia: adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1872, W. Va.
Const. of 1872, art. XI, § 4; reflected in statutory provision in 1873, Act of
Dec. 20, 1873, ch. 181, § 1, 1873 W. Va. Acts 534, 535 (codified at W. Va.
Code § 31-1-93 (1988)).
Wisconsin: adopted permissive cumulative voting in 1989, requiring optin through articles, Wisconsin Business Corporation Law, No. 303, § 13
(§ 180.0728), 1989 Wis. Laws. 1314, 1337 (codified at Wis. Stat. Ann.,
§ 180.0728 (West 1992)).
Wyoming- adopted mandatory cumulative voting in 1911, Act of Feb. 16,
1911, ch.27, § 1, 1911 Wyo. Sess. Laws 41, 42; converted to permissive
cumulative voting in 1989, requiring opt-in through articles but apparently preserving cumulative voting for pre-1989 corporations that do not
opt-out through articles amendment during 1989, Wyoming Business
Corporations Act, ch. 249, §§ 1 (§ 17-16-728), 5, 1989 Wyo, Sess. Laws
505, 537 (codified at Wyo. Stat. § 17-16-728 (1989)).

19941

RELATIONAL INVESTING AND CUMULATIVE VOTING

189

APPENDIX II

Ohio: In Ohio the elimination of cumulative voting was instigated by a
1984 recommendation of the Ohio State Bar Association. See Ohio State
Bar Ass'n, Report on Senate Bill 259: Cumulative Voting 4 (Dec. 1985).
The accompanying Bar Association Report claimed that the "principal
winner" from the change would be "the State of Ohio, because it can be
confidently expected that the additional flexibility which the proposed
legislation would create will assist in obtaining and maintaining incorporations within the State." Id. at 2. The Bar Association was, of course,
also aware of the potential antitakeover implications of the elimination of
cumulative voting. The chair of the cumulative voting subcommittee said
that the need to offer options for corporate protection against takeovers
was a key reason for the legislation. See Leigh Trevor, Voting Bill to Get
Early Attention, Business First of Greater Columbus, Dec. 23, 1985, at 15
(remarks of Leigh Trevor, who was also co-chairman of the Bar Association's Corporation Law Committee), cited in June A. Striegel, Comment,
Cumulative Voting, Yesterday and Today: The July, 1986 Amendments to
Ohio's General Corporation Law, 55 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1265, 1275 n.63
(1987). The Bar Association was also probably influenced by client beliefs that cumulative voting increased firms' vulnerability to takeovers, as
reflected in the reported positions of both the Ohio Chamber of Commerce and the Ohio Manufacturers Association, see Matthew Hall, New
Board Rules: More Outsiders, No More Cumulative Voting, Ohio Bus.,
July 1986, at 58.
The Bar Association asserted that the "disparity" between Ohio and
states without mandatory cumulative voting "puts Ohio at a substantial
disadvantage in the National competition to attract corporate headquarters," Ohio Bar Ass'n Report, supra, at 3, a somewhat puzzling claim,
since many firms headquartered in Ohio were incorporated in Delaware,
but one designed to strengthen the case for the legislative change. The
proposed legislation was initially introduced in the Ohio Senate in September 1985 and was passed by the Senate in February 1986, and then by
the Ohio House in July 1986. See Act of July 24, 1986, § 1, 1986 Ohio
Laws 547, 548-50 (codified at Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1701.55 (Baldwin
1986)); Ohio House Comm. on Civil and Commercial Law, Report on
S.B. 259, at 4 (Mar. 18, 1986). One of the sponsors, Sen. Paul Pfeifer, was
quoted as saying that the legislation arose out of Ohio corporations' fear
of the national "takeover mania." See Striegel, supra, at 1274 n.59.
Illinois: Illinois is a more complicated case because of its multi-step
movement away from mandatory cumulative voting, reflecting certain
tensions appropriate for the jurisdiction that first introduced cumulative
voting to American corporate law. As part of the general redrafting in
1970 of the Illinois Constitution, the constitutional convention eliminated the cumulative voting requirement adopted a century before, citing the importance of attracting new incorporations to Illinois and
retaining existing Illinois corporations. See Roanoke Agency v. Edgar,
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461 N.E.2d 1365, 1369 (Ill. 1984); Wesley G.Nissen, Note, The Constitutionality of the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation Act's Voting Provisions,
1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 647, 660-62 (citing debates at the constitutional convention). But the convention also adopted a transition provision to protect cumulative voting rights of minority shareholders in existing
corporations. See Roanoke Agency, 461 N.E.2d at 1369.
Since mandatory cumulative voting was also prescribed by Illinois
statutory law, it remained in effect until legislative action in 1981 that
enabled the newly-formed corporations to decline cumulative voting with
an appropriate charter term, and allowed existing corporations to remove it through a charter amendment adopted by unanimous shareholder vote. See Act of Sept. 25, 1981, Pub. Act 82-650, § 1, 1981 Ill. Laws
3377, 3379 (codified at Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 805, para. 7.40 (Smith-Hurd
1993) (amending Ill. Bus. Corp. Act § 28)). The amendment was apparently inconsistent with the transition provision of the 1970 constitution,
see Richard A. Sugar & David A. Epstein, Eliminating Cumulative Voting
Rights for Illinois Corporations-Act One, 71 Ill. BarJ. 502 (1983), but
the Illinois Supreme Court found the unanimity requirement an adequate substitute protection of minority shareholder rights in light of "the
profound change in public policy" regarding cumulative voting reflected
in the 1970 constitution. Roanoke Agency, 461 N.E.2d at 1371.
In a key change adopted as part of the 1983 general revision of the
Illinois corporate code, the legislature recognized that the 1981 requirement of a unanimous vote had made the elimination of cumulative voting
a practical impossibility for the existing public firms whose Illinois incorporation the State was trying to retain. The new law required only an
ordinary charter amendment. See 1983 Ill. Laws 83-1025, § 7.40 (codified at Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 805, 5/7.40 (Smith-Hurd 1993)); see also Nissen, supra, at 648. To address the concerns behind the 1970 transition
provision, shareholders voting against elimination of cumulative voting
were given dissenters' rights. (The constitutionality of the 1983 statute is
apparently an open question, particularly in light of the grudging acceptance by the court in Roanoke Agency of even a unanimity requirement.
See 461 N.E.2d at 1371-72.) The Illinois revisers have argued that since
shareholders of a pre-1970 Illinois corporation can be made to suffer the
elimination of cumulative voting through reincorporation in Delaware,
protected only by dissenters rights, they are no worse off if the Illinois
corporation is permitted to take such action itself, and might be better off
since Illinois law might be otherwise more protective. See William H.
Painter, Introduction to Symposium on the 1983 Illinois Business Corporation Act, 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 635, 638-39 (Professor Painter was a member of the Illinois Secretary of State's Advisory Committee that drafted
the 1983 revision.); see also Nissen, supra, at 669.
The impetus for the 1981 legislation came from the Illinois State Bar
Association. See Illinois House of Representatives, Transcription of Debate on H.B. 419, 131 (May 14, 1981) (statement of Rep. Lechowicz,
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sponsor); id. at 88 (July 1, 1981) (same). For the 1983 general revision,
the first in 50 years, the Illinois Secretary of State assembled an advisory
committee of legislators, lawyers, and business representatives. The actors on both occasions were keenly aware that cumulative voting contributed to the "flight" of Illinois corporations to other jurisdictions,
especially Delaware. See, e.g., Illinois House of Representatives, Transcription of Debate on H.B. 419, 133 (May 14, 1981) (statement of Rep.
Leinenweber) ("This Bill . .. does tend to bring the law in Illinois to
become a little bit more flexible, a little bit more in line with the other
states .

.

. and ...

we would encourage people to stay in Illinois and

incorporate here rather than go elsewhere."); Painter, supra, at 638; Nissen, supra, at 654-55.
To be sure, the elimination of mandatory cumulative voting showed
responsiveness to managerial governance preferences. It was also the
case that the Illinois mandatory cumulative provision had been construed
so broadly as to hamper a board's responsiveness to genuine business dilemmas, see, e.g., People ex rel. Weber v. Cohn, 171 N.E. 159 (Ill. 1930)
(prohibiting directors from filling board vacancies), and to preclude certain finance options, such as issuance of nonvoting shares, see People ex
rel. Watseka Telephone Co. v. Emmerson, 134 N.E. 707, 710 (Ill. 1922).
Missouri: In Missouri, the elimination of cumulative voting, which was
embedded in the state constitution as well as the corporate code, see Appendix I, was initiated in 1987 by the Business Law Committee of the
Missouri Bar. See generally Don G. Lents & Virginia S. Pentland, Elimination of Mandatory Cumulative Voting in Missouri, 47 J. Mo. B. 21
(Jan.-Feb. 1991) (Lents was vice chairman of the Business Law Committee). The motives were standard: the sense that mandatory cumulative
voting was not part of a "modern" corporate statute, as reflected by its
elimination in the Model Business Corporation Act; the opposition of the
corporate community, especially Missouri public corporations, who worried about its unpredictable effects and possible uses in hostile takeovers;
and the effort to retain Missouri corporate status for the approximately
dozen large firms incorporated in Missouri, such as Ralston Purina and
Emerson Electric. Telephone Interview with Don Lents (Aug. 20, 1993);
Telephone Interview with Prof. Richard Tyler, member of the Business
Law Committee of the Missouri bar (Aug. 24, 1993). The Missouri General Assembly approved presentation of the constitutional amendment
for a March 1988 vote. The public explanation of the proposed amendment was that passage "would add to the tools available to Missouri in its
efforts to attract and retain businesses," Don G. Lents, Proposition 2 May
Aid Business Growth, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Feb. 26, 1988, at 3C, and
that cumulative voting could facilitate hostile takeovers, see id. The antitakeover appeal would have had public resonance because of the very
recent hostile takeover of TWA, which had major business operations in
Missouri, by Carl Icahn.
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Notwithstanding the lack of organized opposition, the constitutional
amendment was defeated by a narrow margin, apparently because it appeared on the same ballot as a widely unpopular tax measure and was
joined with a proposal regarding consideration for corporate shares that
suggested it had fiscal implications. Lents interview, supra. The state legislature agreed to submit a measure limited to cumulative voting to the
voters in August 1988. The corporate community invested greater resources in public support and lobbying for the amendment and it passed
by a large majority. Tyler interview, supra. Implementing legislation,
also endorsed by the Bar and promoted by the corporate community, was
proposed in the next legislative session and enacted by June 1989. The
legislation allows corporations to opt out of cumulative voting either
through bylaw amendment or charter amendment. This means that in
cases where cumulative voting had been prescribed in the bylaws only
and where, as is typical, directors have power to amend the by laws, shareholder approval may not be required. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 351.245 (3)
(Vernon 1991).

